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This thesis explores the fundamental research puzzle of why non-state nations struggle to 
achieve independent sovereign statehood through secession. It explores why non-state nations 
like the Kurds desire sovereign statehood, and why they fail to achieve it. 
This thesis argues two main points. Firstly, non-state nations such as the Kurds seek 
sovereign statehood because of two main reasons: the essence of nationhood and national 
self-determination is sovereign statehood; and that non-state nations are usually treated 
unfairly and unjustly by their host state and thus develop a strong moral case for secession 
and sovereign statehood.  
Secondly, non-state nations like the Kurds fail to achieve sovereign statehood mainly because 
of key endogenous and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors comprise internal 
divisions which result in failure to achieve a unified secessionist challenge, due to differences 
in factions which result in divergent objectives and perspectives, and the high chances of 
regime co-optation of dissident factions. Exogenous factors include the international 
normative regime which is unsupportive of secession, hence non-state nations like the Kurds 
do not receive support from the UN and other global bodies in their quest for sovereign 
statehood; and that non-state nations also seldom receive the backing from Major Powers, 
both democratic and non-democratic, in their efforts to secede from their host state and set up 
their own sovereign state. 
This thesis explores secession theory and the problem of non-state nations in international 
relations, Kurdish history, nationhood and desire for Kurdistan, the Kurdish struggles for an 
independent Kurdistan in recent history and concludes that whilst the current conflict in the 
Middle East provides the Kurds with yet another ‘window’ of opportunity, the historical 
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The “Kurdish Question”, which originally derives from a mistranslation of the Turkish phrase 
“Kurt Sorunu” or “Kurdish problem”, is a term used to describe the social, economic, 
political and ideological situation of the Kurdish people who lack sovereign statehood. The 
Kurdish question has increasing regional and international significance, as the Kurds are a 
key stakeholder within the Middle East and are critical to international security strategy and 
conflict resolution in Syria-Iraq.  
The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic nation in the Middle East after the Arabs, Persians and 
Turks (Alliance for Kurdish Rights, 2016), yet Kurdish nationalism has not yet succeeded in 
achieving independent statehood thus making the Kurds one of the largest non-state nations 
in world politics (Hassanpour, 2015, p. 1). The Kurds have an approximate global population 
of over 30 million, with a homeland, called Kurdistan, divided between Iraq, Syria, Iran, 
Turkey (Stratfor, 2016) and to a smaller extent Azerbaijan and Armenia. Despite this regional 
presence and many opportunities to secure independence throughout the 20th century 
(Alliance for Kurdish Rights, 2016), the Kurds have failed to form their own national state. 
In recent years, however, the Kurds have achieved international prominence once again. The 
contemporary conflict in the Middle East has put the persistently unresolved Kurdish 
question back into the spotlight as it is inextricably linked to the stability of the region. Three 
possible future flashpoints could influence the trajectory of Kurdish opportunity in the 
Middle East. Firstly, Iraqi Kurdish independence would trigger conflict with Baghdad, and 
intensify the sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shia Arabs in Iraq. Secondly, Kurdish 
gains against the Islamic State in Syria-Iraq might increase international support for the 
Kurds and potentially instigate backlash from neighbouring Turkey, which is concerned by 
the empowerment of Kurdish groups across its borders. Lastly, Turkey-PKK relations could 
be provoked and lead to the resumption of conflict and the reversal of the rights of Turkey’s 
Kurdish population. These new political realities in the Middle East have transformed the 
region and have possibly provided a catalyst for changing and re-mapping national borders. 
The key puzzle is whether the establishment of a Kurdish state is possible, despite internal 
and external obstacles, and whether the instability in the Middle East could be exploited by 
the Kurds to redefine boundaries and establish a sustainable nation-state.  
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Fundamentally, a resolution to the conflict in Syria-Iraq cannot be effectively determined 
without a resolution for the Kurds. Hence, the ‘Kurdish question’ has resurfaced because of 
contemporary events and may prove to be the central issue ascertaining the stability of Iraq, 
Syria, and even Turkey. In coalition with the United States, the Kurds (in Syria mainly but 
also in Iraq) have played a key role in combatting the Islamic State, which has claimed 
substantial territory in Iraq and Syria (Laub, 2015) along with establishing significant 
presence in places like Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (The Daily Telegraph, 2015). The Kurdish Peshmerga forces have halted Islamic 
State expansion into the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq, have taken control over the oil 
rich region of Kirkuk, and have filled in control of territory where Syrian and Iraqi forces 
have retreated (Council for Foreign Relations, 2015). Washington sees the abolishment of the 
Islamic State as a requisite for maintaining Iraq; however, many Kurds see this goal as a 
chance for independence as the last remaining functional government in the region (Preysner, 
2015). Salih Muslim, the co-leader of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria 
highlighted the impact that the Islamic State has had on Kurdish factions, saying that whilst 
“some sensitive issues had arisen between these groups earlier, ISIL [Islamic State] now 
pushes Kurds to come together, which is very good” (Council for Foreign Relations, 2015). 
This mutual enemy has diffused intra-Kurdish conflict and united Kurdish factions towards 
the common goal of combatting the Islamic State. The success of Kurdish forces in 
combatting the Islamic State could also attract further international support, which would 
increase Kurdish state building power and further bolster the opportunity for Kurdish 
autonomy and independence.  
Research Puzzle: 
The main research puzzle that this thesis will explore is why non-state nations such as the 
Kurds find it extremely difficult to achieve independent statehood through secession (indeed, 
successful secessions are extremely rare in international politics)? A historical analysis of 
Kurdish attempts to secede will provide insight into this puzzle and may also offer 
suggestions regarding the future political fate of the Kurds in the context of political turmoil, 
civil war and possible state break-up and reorganization in the Middle East.  
Following on from the main research puzzle, the central research question that this thesis will 
address is why, despite decades of struggle, have the Kurds been unsuccessful in attaining 
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sovereign statehood, and whether in the context of the current wars in Iraq and Syria they 
stand a realistic chance of achieving their long-cherished goal of an independent Kurdistan 
state? To answer this central research question, the thesis will address several sub-questions: 
 
• What are non-state nations and why do they desire sovereign statehood? 
• Why is secession the most common way of or means for non-state nations to achieve 
sovereign statehood? What is the international normative regime on secession and 
what factors usually determine whether a secessionist movement would be successful 
or unsuccessful? 
• How did the Kurds come to become a non-state nation? When and why did a 
sovereign Kurdistan State become the central objective of Kurdish politics? 
• In recent times the Kurds made several unsuccessful attempts to secede and create a 
sovereign Kurdistan State. Why did these secessionist attempts fail? 
• In the context of the current wars in the Middle East, do the Kurds stand a realistic 
chance to secede from Iraq and Syria and create a sovereign Kurdistan State? What 
major obstacles or roadblocks stand in their way of achieving this long-cherished 
goal? Can these obstacles be overcome? 
 
Chapter one will cover the background theory of the research and will explore the problem of 
non-state nations in international relations and the factors that drive non-state nations to strive 
for secession and sovereign statehood. It will explore the fundamental concepts of 
nationhood, statehood and evaluate how and why non-state nations attempt secession, and 
what internal and obstacles exist that challenge this goal. The chapter will also provide an 
analysis of the requisite conditions for successful secession movements. This will include an 
analysis of the international normative regime on secession, perspectives of host states, Major 
Powers and the international community on secession, and the problem of internal politics 
and cohesion within the secessionist group. As secession is exceptionally hard to attain, 
especially for non-state nations, the availability of international support particularly from 
Major Powers and IGOs is critical for success. This chapter will discuss ‘endogenous’ and 
‘exogenous’ factors that determine the success or failure of secessionist movements. These 
conditions are exceptionally tough to meet, which is why most non-state nations fail to 
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secede. The Kurdish quest for secession in the 20th century provides an excellent example of 
how non-state nations can become pawns of Major Powers, and inevitably get stuck in futile 
cycles of struggle for independence.  This chapter will establish the analytical framework 
which this thesis will utilise to address and understand the Kurdish situation and future of 
non-state nation secession.  
 
Chapter two will provide an overview of the Kurds. This chapter will explain who the Kurds 
are, how they came to be a divided non-state nation and the reasons for their quest for an 
independent Kurdistan. The chapter will also explain how being divided into several 
countries have affected Kurdish identity and politics, and whether this has adversely 
impacted or diluted their collective goal for an independent Kurdistan. 
Chapter three will explain the various secessionist attempts made by the Kurds in the 20th 
century to achieve Kurdistan and the reasons why these attempts failed. The chapter will 
argue that there were three main reasons for Kurdish failure to secede and achieve an 
independent Kurdistan: significant internal divisions within the Kurds that prevented a 
unified secessionist political movement for an independent Kurdistan from emerging and 
being sustained over a period of time; inability of the Kurds to militarily overpower the 
forces of the host states that were opposed to Kurdish secession and independent statehood; 
and lack of support (instrumental and affective) from the Major Powers and key international 
organizations for Kurdish independence and the establishment of an independent Kurdistan 
state. The chapter will also argue that repeated failures, generational changes, host state 
crackdowns and outmigration of Kurds from the region also contributed to the gradual 
weakening of the desire and movement for an independent Kurdistan state.  
 
Chapter four will analyse the current situation in the Middle East in terms of territory, 
conflict, the internal situation for each Kurdish contingent, Major Power strategy and 
interests, geopolitical stakeholders and the international normative regime and stance of 
influencing IGO’s and non-state actors. This chapter will contrast the previous Kurdish 
struggles for independent statehood with the current situation in Iraq, Syria and to a lesser 





This thesis will put forward the key argument that while endogenous factors are important, 
secession by non-state nations is almost impossible without international recognition and 
support, especially from the Great Powers and leading IGO’s; since such support is 
exceptionally hard to obtain, successful secession by non-state nations is rare in international 
politics.  
 
This thesis will argue two main points. Firstly, that non-state nations like the Kurds seek 
sovereign statehood because the essence of nationhood and national self-determination is 
sovereign statehood; and that non-state nations are usually treated unfairly and unjustly by 
their host state and thus develop a strong moral case for secession and sovereign statehood.  
Secondly, non-state nations like the Kurds fail to achieve sovereign statehood mainly because 
of endogenous and exogenous reasons: (endogenous) groups like the Kurds that are internally 
divided often fail to launch an unified secessionist challenge; different factions/platforms pull 
in different directions; and chances of regime co-optation of dissident factions remains high; 
(exogenous) the international normative regime is unsupportive of secession, hence non-state 
nations like the Kurds do not receive support from the UN and other global bodies in their 
quest for sovereign statehood; and that non-state nations also seldom receive the backing 
from Major Powers (both democratic and non-democratic) in their efforts to secede from 
their host state and set up their own sovereign and independent state. 
The Kurdish situation is ideal for testing this argument. Through historical analysis of 
Kurdish efforts to secede and create an independent Kurdistan his thesis will contend that 
spikes in Kurdish secessionist behaviour were the direct result of promises of assistance by 
the Major Powers and the international community, which when not honoured led to failures. 
Whilst it cannot be denied that there are other issues that inhibit secession for the Kurds, 
whether it is internal divergence and discord and geopolitical interference, this thesis will 
contend that the international normative regime acts as the strongest inhibitor of Kurdish 
independent statehood. A key criterion of endogenous and exogenous factors will be utilised 
to substantiate this contention. This thesis will also argue that the current situation in the 
Middle East is providing perhaps the best opportunity for secession and independent 
statehood that the Kurds (particularly in Iraq and Syria) have seen to date; however, for 
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secession and independence to happen, the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds will require sustained and 
steadfast support from the Major Powers (particularly the United States and Russia) and the 
United Nations, which appears to be unlikely to happen. The best outcome then that Iraqi and 
Syrian Kurds can hope for is to successfully bargain for an ‘autonomous status’ with a post-
war Iraq and Syria. 
 
Research notes: 
This thesis will depend primarily on qualitative research that has been sourced from reputable 
secondary sources and will be bolstered by select primary sources such as governmental and 
media reports. These reference materials have been acquired from numerous library and 
online journal searches, to provide a comprehensive analysis that utilises only the most 
reliable sources. There are no sensitivities surrounding the research of non-state nation and 
secession theory, and this information is easily accessible. The historical analysis will be 
approached using a broad range of academic journals, books and news reports. These sources 
are easily accessible, and do not have any ethical constraints or considerations. The literature 
that has been reviewed has been sourced from a variety of academic and media libraries. The 
Australian National University library, University of New South Wales library and the 
Murdoch University library provided valuable access to textbooks and journals, whilst online 
geopolitical reporting media sites and Google Scholar provided literature for reviewing the 









Chapter 1: Secession Theory and the Problem of Non-State Nations 
Chapter Summary  
This chapter will explore the concept of nations, states, non-state nations and 
nationalism. It will explore the reasons that drive non-state nations towards self-
determination and secession from their host states. It will further explore what factors hinder 
or support secession, including restrictions imposed by the international normative regime on 
secession, moral arguments in favour of secession, state responses to demands for self-
determination, and various accommodative approaches as alternatives to secession. This will 
provide a fundamental theoretical basis for the analysis of subsequent chapters and details of 
the framework of endogenous and exogenous factors that are critical for the successful 
secession of non-state nations.   
The Problem of Non-State Nations in International Relations: 
The issue of non-state nations has been a major problem in international relations, 
particularly since the beginning of the 20th century. Nationalism drives non-state nations 
towards self-determination for succession. The achievement of sovereign statehood is the 
only way that nations can fulfil their goal of development, autonomy and independence.  
Nationalism as a driver for Self-Determination 
The concepts of a nation, and nationalism are inextricably linked, where “nationalism 
is normally conceived as an ideology or movement aiming at attaining and maintaining 
political autonomy, mainly in the form of state sovereignty, for a group of people called 
nation” (Podoksik, 2017, p. 303). The concept of nationalism is a critical factor that 
determines why minority nations strive to secede from their host states. Nationalism can be 
defined as encompassing two phenomena, which includes “the attitude that the members of a 
nation have when they care about their national identity” and “the actions that the members 
of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination” (Miscevic, 2014). 
The first part of this definition highlights the importance of social and cultural identity, which 
form national identity. This often based on ethnicity, language and commonality. This is also 
generally the determining factor of whether citizenship is voluntary or involuntary and is 
what sets apart minority nations within a host state. The second part of this definition 
identifies the importance of self-determination for minority nations that have a collective 
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identity, that wish to be autonomous from other nations that do not share this common 
distinctiveness. Nationalism is based on the shared identity, through historical, cultural, 
language or religions bonds (Huysseune, 2012, p. 2). Nationalism joins the ethno-cultural 
domain with the political organisation domain and links the concept of a nation with the 
concept of a state. Non-state nations are therefore simply minority nations with nationalism 
that strive for autonomy and statehood to fulfil their goals of self-determination. Nationalism 
plays an intrinsic part in the international system and is a fundamental element of statehood. 
Nationalism is fundamental to self-determination. Achieving a sovereign state of their own is 
the only way that nations can truly fulfil their development. Nationalism therefore drives non-
state nations towards self-determination, and to sovereign statehood.  
 
This drive for self-determination is underpinned by ethnonationalism. This can be 
defined as “advocacy of or support for the political interests of a particular ethnic group, 
especially its national independence or self-determination” (Oxford, 2018). It is usually 
referred to as a form of nationalism, where the nation is defined by ethnicity. This is often 
defined by shared heritage, language, culture, faith and ethnic ancestry.  Ethno-nationalism 
can be explained by constructivist, instrumentalist and primordialist approaches. 
Constructivism deems ethno-nationalism as a construct of modern, elite society, which 
changes based on power structures. Instrumentalist perspectives see ethnicity and nationalism 
as concepts propagated by elite society to further political and economic power agendas. The 
primordialist approach defines ethnicity as “an objective entity with inherent features such as 
race, territory, language and kinship” (Yavus, 2007, p. 10), which is supported by Kurdish 
Nationalists that seek to bolster Kurdish identity with historical roots.  
Nationalism is a movement aimed at establishing a nation-state, and that nation-state 
is a fundamental political unit in the world order (Keating, 2000, p. 1463). The concept of a 
state has a very long history; however, the term “nation-state” is a newer phenomenon. Early 
scholar Hans Kohn (1961, p. 16) described a nation-state as a will, and described that 
Nationalism is a state of mind permeating the large majority of the people and 
claiming to permeate all its members; it recognises the nation-State as the ideal form 
of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural 
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energy and economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore due to his 
nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in and made possible by its welfare. 
An alternative definition details that a nation-state is “a form of political organization in 
which a group of people who share the same history, traditions, or language live in a 
particular area under one government” (Merriam Webster , 2016).  
Whilst a state is a framework for internal and external security, economic 
relationships and boundaries, a nation represents social and economic organization, through 
collective identity, culture and solidarity. The concept of minority nations originated in 1648 
as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia between France and the Roman Empire, which 
acknowledged the “territorial unity and sovereignty of nation-states as well as the capability 
of choosing their ‘own’ religion”, for the first time (Ibraimi, 2013, p. 672). From the 16th and 
17th centuries, religion was the main defining factor for differentiating minority nations. The 
18th century brought the shift from religion through to nationalism; encompassing secular 
and language identification. William Bloom (1993) defined this emerging concept of the 
nation-state, as “as a kind of ‘polity’ including four major determinants, namely territoriality-
within a demarcated territory-, sovereignty-granting the ‘arbitrator’ status to the state-, 
centrality-centralized authority that does not need intermediaries and nationality-to achieve a 
‘uniformed society’”. The 19th and 20th centuries have developed the concept of nationalism 
within a state further, to link it with culture, identity, common language and a desire to live 
together.  
The contemporary definition of a nation-state is comprehensive, however inherently 
complicated, and has arguably resurrected the concept of nationalism in state-building theory. 
‘State-building’ and ‘nation-building’ are often confused terms; however, nation-building is 
most frequently referred to as the creation of a cultural identity, whilst state-building is the 
formation of an autonomous, independent state system  (Scott, 2007, p. 3). International 
relations, security and peacekeeping, political science, and economic literature all have 
different perspectives and theories on state-building and nation-building. Whilst there is 
extensive literature on both concepts, they can be summarised with key criteria.  Nation-
building theory can be summarised as “a process of socio-political development, which 
ideally – usually over a longer historical time span – allows initially loosely linked 
communities to become a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it” (Bennett, 
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2014). Dobbins  (2006, p. 32) identifies the key responsibilities of a legitimate and successful 
state as ensuring security, humanitarian and relief efforts, governance, economic stability, 
democratisation and development and stability. Whilst the transformation of the state has 
encouraged the re-emergence of nationalism within state borders, if states are willing to move 
away from the “state‐centred tradition of much historical and political science research” and 
foster an “appreciation of the importance of other frameworks of identity and collective 
action” (2001, p. 56), they will be able to effectively find a way to accommodate nationalist 
demands that fit within the emerging international regime.  
These minority nations that live within a nation-state generally have their own 
nationalism and cultural identity. A non-state nation is defined by Bertelsen (1979, p. 123) as 
“any entity that operates in a manner normally associated with the nation-state i.e. organised 
violence, international collaborative effort such as terrorist activity, however the entity is not 
recognised as a nation”. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights defines a minority 
nation as “a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-
dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with 
one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to 
achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law” (United Nations Human Rights 
Committee , 2012, p. 7).  
Nation-states often seek self-determination through sovereignty over their homeland 
to be permanent, exclusive, inalienable, exclusive, absolute and unified. This sovereignty 
must be over what the nation defines as their “homeland”, based on history and cultural ties. 
Radan (2007, p. 9) defines sovereignty as “a political and legal right to control or to rule over 
all inhabitants on a particular territory which overrides all other rights to exercise power and 
control”. The concept of sovereignty has two levels; internal and external. Internal 
sovereignty means that the state has supremacy over internal affairs such as people and 
resources, without external interference (Makinda, 1996, p. 150). External sovereignty, or 
juridical sovereignty, guarantees the territory of the state. All sovereign states have people, 
territory and a government (Fowler & Munck, 1996, p. 381); however, it is the 
comprehensive position in the international community, recognition and power that truly 
gives a nation its statehood. It ensures supreme authority over a territory, without 
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compromise. Non-state nations assert sovereignty; however, they lack the recognition, power 
and sole control which comes with official statehood and autonomy. Attaining statehood and 
sovereignty is the ultimate aim of most non-state nations, usually through secession.  
Non-state nations have been a cause for concern in international relations for three 
key reasons. Most states attempt to govern their minority population, through various degrees 
of control measures. States treat their minority nations in a variety of different ways ranging 
from assimilation, acculturation, accommodation through primitive autonomy, co-optation, 
divide and rule, discrimination, repression, expulsion, and extermination. If minority nations 
are unhappy with their treatment, they often rebel and attempt to secede from the host state. 
These secession attempts spark conflict and civil war, human rights issues, refugees, and the 
possibility of state breakdown. Lastly, the conflict and humanitarian issues usually attract 
international attention, involvement and intervention and can therefore lead to further 
complications.  
Nations, States and Non-State Nations: 
The concept of a nation is fundamental, as is the distinction between a nation and a 
nation-state. A nation is defined by Walker (1978, p. 379) as:  
A social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, 
and a sense of homogeneity. 'Nation' is difficult to define so precisely as to 
differentiate the term from such other groups as religious sects, which exhibit some of 
the same characteristics. In the nation, however, there is also present a strong group 
sense of belonging associated with a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its 
own. 
This definition highlights that the key elements of a nation comprise identity, rather than 
sovereignty or statehood. This is a critical distinction, as it separates ethnonationalism, 
identity, culture from  sovereignty, statehood and autonomy.  
The concepts of nations, states and multinational states are often confused. Most 
existing states are not actually nation-states but multinational states as they comprise more 
than one nation. It is argued that if a single nation accounts for the majority of the population, 
the sovereign state is then therefore a nation state. A nation-state refers to the overlap of the 
nation, and the state. It would not be possible to define a nation purely by cultural and ethnic 
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homogeneity. It is however possible to define a nation in terms of civic lines. All nations and 
states comprise ethnic groups. According to Coakley, (2012, p. 6) ethnic groups are 
“fundamental units of social organisation which consist of members who define themselves, 
or are defined, by a sense of common historical origins that may also include religious 
beliefs, a similar language, or a shared culture”. The concept of a nation emerges when an 
ethnic group develops from a homeland society or diaspora community, to an ethnic group 
through the development of political and statist ideas (Taras & Ganguly, 2006, p. 2). An early 
definition of a nation is: 
A body of [people] inhabiting a definite territory, who normally are drawn from 
different races, but possess a common stock of thoughts and feelings acquired and 
transmitted during the course of a common history; who on the whole and in the main 
though more in a past than in the present, include in that common stock a common 
religious belief; who general and as a rule use a common language as the vehicle of 
their thoughts and feelings; and who, besides common thoughts and feelings, also 
cherish a common will, and accordingly form, or tend to form a separate state for the 
expression and realisation of that will” (Barker, 1927).  
The crux of this definition is the mobilisation of its members towards self-determination, to 
achieve statehood. When located within another state, these groups can be defined as non-
state nations.  
The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it possesses an 
administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organised 
activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. 
This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the 
citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent 
over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organisation 
with a territorial basis. Furthermore, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it 
is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it…The claim of the modern state to 
monopolise the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and 
of continuous operation” (Weber, 1978, p. 56) 
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These definitions confirm the contention that most States comprise more than one 
nation, including non-state nations. Here lies the inherent issue of non-state nations that have 
their own nationalism and nationalist ambitions which often leads to the quest for self-
determination.   
Non-State Nations and Secession: 
Secession is an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in contemporary politics and is 
still widely disputed.1 Autonomy is often a fundamental demand for ethnic groups or nations, 
which therefore makes secession an enduring feature of international politics. It is estimated 
that there are over eight thousand “ethno-national groups” in the world, however there are 
fewer than 200 internationally recognized states (Bennett, 2014, p. 2). Most states are 
therefore categorised as “multinational states” (Norman, 2003, p. 3566) and encompass 
numerous national groups.  Badie and Berg-Schlosser (2011) stated that “given the countless 
unresolved cultural and territorial disputes and the many unsatisfied aspirations of nations in 
Africa, Asia and even in the West, for example, Quebec, Catalonia, the Basques, Flanders, 
Scotland, and Wales - secession continues to be a force to be reckoned with in international 
politics”.  
There is no scholarly consensus surrounding the definition of secession. A working 
definition of secession is that it is “a process of withdrawal of a territory and its population 
from an existing state and the creation of a new state on that territory” (Radan & Pavkovic, 
2011, p. 1). Heraclides (1991, p. 241) defines secession as “an abrupt unilateral move to 
independence on the part of a certain region from within the metropolitan territory of a 
sovereign independent state. It is set forth by an act of declaration of independence, which is 
manifestly opposed by the state in question.” Heraclides further differentiates between abrupt 
secession, which is usually accompanied by a declared intention to secede, and incremental 
succession, which involves a clear process of “political activity that may or may not be 
violent and which is aimed at independence and short of this at a formula of self-
                                                          
1 There are three broad perspectives on secession: anti-secessionists who oppose the right to secession with the exception of 
certain conditions, the pro-secessionists who support it, again subject to certain conditions; and those who support or oppose 
secession depending on certain considerations (Lehning, et al., 1998, p. 13). These perspectives are underpinned by liberal 
political theory, and communitarian disciplines (Lehning, et al., 1998, p. 149). The considerations are generally framed by 
the social, economic and political characteristics of the situation of the secessionist group, and therefore differ on a case by 




government”. Hülsmann (2003, p. 372) states that the ultimate purpose of secession is “to 
break the compulsory ties between the secessionists and a government which they no longer 
accept”. Secession is therefore a strategy that is used by ethnic nations, to exercise their right 
of self-determination, with the intent of attaining autonomy and independent statehood.  
Toft (2012, p. 583) explores conceptual issues associated with secession, and 
evaluates primordialist and constructivist theory to contend that ethnic identity is at the core 
of self-determination. As self-determination is driven by ethnic identity and nationalism, 
secession is one of the most prevalent forms through which non-state nations seek to achieve 
sovereign statehood and its recognition from the host state and the international community.  
Many scholarly definitions conflict on points surrounding whether host state 
opposition is required, whether the secession movement must utilise threat of force and 
whether state formation through decolonisation is included (Radan & Pavkovic, 2011, p. 3). 
Heraclides (1991, p. 2) aptly identifies that “pure” secessionist movements are “secessionist-
irredentist movements”, including direct self-determination such as Bangladesh and Katanga, 
along with incremental movements such as the Kurds, the Eritreans, the Southern Sudanese 
and the Moros. This argument identifies that secession can either be an abrupt declaration of 
sovereignty, which was the case with Bangladesh and Katanga. Alternatively, it can be an 
incremental process which is the case most of the time. These non-state nations “orphans of 
the universe” as described by Barzani, a Kurdish leader (Heraclides, 1991, p. 2). Secession is 
the aim of these non-state nations who have autonomous nationalism, culture and identity, 
however are yet to attain independent statehood. Members of a secessionist movement must 
share a common identity, along with the common political goal for independence. Members 
of the group can encompass a wide network of various social statuses, classes and political 
orientation (Radan & Pavkovic, 2013, p. 45), as long as their fundamental goals for 
independence align 
Secession movements have key characteristics that underpin their self-determination 
efforts. Radan and Pavkovic (2013) contend that secession movements have four basic 
attributes. The movement must be a “bounded territory within an existing state”, have a 
“population within that territory”, and a political drive targeting the surrounding population 
that “has proclaimed the independence of a new state based on that territory” and “has 
attempted to gain recognition of that independence by other states and international 
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organisations” (Radan & Pavkovic, 2011, p. 33). In addition to these characteristics, there are 
certain conditions that flag as features for successful secession attempts. In a comprehensive 
analysis of historical secession, Heraclides (1991) evaluates the commonalities of non-state 
nation self-determination. Heraclides’s model of secession deems that territory and a 
territorial base for collectivity, the existence of a sizeable human grouping that defines itself 
as distinct and a relationship between this collectivity and the host state are mandatory 
elements for secession (Heraclides, The Self-determination of Minorities in International 
Politics, 1991, p. 13). These three elements must be interrelated, and the group seeking 
autonomy should pose a threat to the host nation. Knoblett (2016, p. 23) furthers this model, 
through identifying that the “existence of a segment state, justification for self-determination, 
and working within the international community are crucial to the actual establishment of a 
state”. Knoblett also cites natural resources, great power support, and a catalyst for change 
(2016, p. 24) as critical elements for secession. Roeder (2008, p. 11) supports this point about 
a catalyst for change, by stating that a “crisis” leads to minority groups to want an “upgrade”. 
This links in with segment state theory, which contends that a segment state “upgrades into a 
sovereign state when there is some crisis or failure of the previous central government” 
(Knoblett, 2016, p. 17). Not only can a crisis provide motivation for non-state nation 
secession, it can also provide the means. Change and conflict can be a means to which 
movements can gain momentum, support and resources.  
Secession is an international issue, as “self-determination movements tend to be 
defensive, territorially confined, and limited in scope, the dynamics of bargaining and the 
nature of stakes compel patron states and outside actors to get involved” (Toft, 2012, p. 582) 
and therefore frequently develops into civil war. The international community also plays a 
critical role in the prospective success of secessionist movements, as the stance of other states 
can fundamentally support or block secession. Radan and Pavkovic (2013, p. 36) formulated 
three interrelated ways in which a non-state nation may achieve international recognition of 
its independence. The first way is through “the official recognition of its independence by 
other independent states and international organisations such as the European Union” (Radan 
& Pavkovic, 2013, p. 36). The second step is the formal recognition of the former host state 
or successor. Then thirdly, the admission of the new state to the membership of the United 
Nations (Radan & Pavkovic, 2013, p. 36). In the case of non-state nation secession, 
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international involvement and recognition is paramount to not only attaining autonomy and 
statehood, but ongoing viability and sustainment. 
International Normative Regime on Secession: 
International activity, in the context of self-determination can be defined as a “plea for 
world concern, or a plea for involvement on the part of a third-party (state, IGO, NGO or sub-
units of these three) by the secessionist front or secessionist movement” (Heraclides, 1991, p. 
241). Heraclides also defines partisan international activity as an  
“activity by a government, IGO, NGO or their sub-units which results in enhancing 
the position of the secessionist (even if it is not deliberate), or which is aimed at 
enhancing the secessionist position. Partisan international involvement is of two 
general types: (a) tangible involvement which is divided into material (or utilitarian) 
aid, aid by way of access, and assistance by way of services rendered; and (b) 
political-diplomatic and moral support. Partisan international involvement can be 
based on instrumental motives and/or on affective motives, there can thus be 
“instrumental involvement” and “affective involvement”” (Heraclides, 1991, p. 241).  
The international normative regime on state intervention and involvement in non-state nation 
self-determination, is most often to stay at arm’s length. The reasons that other states don’t 
get involved are twofold. Firstly, due to the inherent disinclination of the international 
community towards secession and secondly, due to lack of instrumental motivation. 
Heraclides further contends that “The most common single reason for state support is 
instrumental in nature. It is international political gain” (Heraclides, 1991, p. 245). Partisan 
supporters are more inclined to provide “cheap” intangible support, in the form of moral and 
political support rather than tangible forms of support such as diplomatic recognition or 
ground assistance (Heraclides, 1991, p. 245). 
Scholars of international relations commonly argue that the transnational legal 
policies on self-determination fail to explain the situational reality; that secession is not 
supported by the international community. Sterio (2013, p. 3) contends that whilst 
“secessionist groups like the East Timorese, the Kosovar Albanians and the South Sudanese 
have been successful in their quests for independent statehood, other similarly situated groups 
have been relegated to an at times violent existence within their mother states.” Many non-
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state nations remain stagnant in their battle for self-determination. Among these are the 
Chechens in Russia, the South Ossetians and Abkhaz that are monopolized by the 
geopolitical power balance in the Caucuses region, and the Kurds that remain in fractured 
contingents throughout the Middle East including Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Sterio (2013, p. 52) 
asserts that “the Rule of the Great Powers” means that self-determination movements will 
only attain secession if they have the support of most powerful states. These “Great Powers” 
are the political, economic and military leaders of the world and include the United States, 
China, Russia, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, German and Italy (USILD, 2015).   
Out of the Great Powers, the Russia and China appear to have minimal concern about 
supporting secessionist movements. Russia did however oppose Biafra 2. The United States 
is in principle against secession and has opposed Bangladesh and Katanga (Heraclides, The 
Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics, 1991, p. 204). It has provided arms 
to groups such as the Kurds, however this was hardly an endorsement of secession. 
America’s support of the Kurds is aimed to assist their fight against Islamic State, and to 
further U.S interests in the Middle East. The United Kingdom has some minor involvement in 
the Nigerian secessionist war yet provided resources for Lagos to beat Biafra (Atofarati, 
1992). Italy has demonstrated a general nonchalance for secession, and whilst it was 
empathetic towards the Eritrean independence in the 1940’s, it avoided any real involvement 
(Heraclides, The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics, 1991, p. 204). 
Generally, the Great Powers don’t get involved in secession movements unless the success of 
the movement furthers their state interests.  
The majority of political science scholars contend that international norms are 
predisposed towards maintaining the current international system and order. Heraclides’s 
study (1991, p. 46) aimed to “establish patterns of interaction between the international 
system and secessionist minorities” and concluded that the international normative regime is 
generally opposed to the emergence of new states, and that neighbouring, and host states 
historically fail to remain neutral. In “Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements: 
The Democratic Factor”, Bélanger, Duhesne, & Paquin (2005, p. 32) demonstrated that 
democratic states are very unlikely to support secessionist movements in other democracies. 
                                                          
2 A secessionist western African state that unilaterally declared its independence from Nigeria in May 1967.  
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This follows Democratic Peace theory. It was also identified that Autocratic countries are 
significantly more likely to intervene in secessionist movements in other Autocratic states, 
than they are to interfere in Democratic states. As most of the Great Powers are democratic, 
this shows that due to their political nature, they are less inclined to get involved in 
secessionist movements.  
Non-democratic Great Powers including China and Russia are not likely to back 
secessionist demands from non-state nations. China has a long history of repressing uprisings 
from its ethnic minorities. In China, the indigenous ethnic Uighur population has been 
repressed by the Chinese state. Activists argue that the Chinese state curtail the commercial 
and cultural activities of the Uighur, including restrictions on Islamic schools and mosques 
(BBC, 2014). The Uighurs carried out numerous protests in 2009, with violent riots breaking 
out in Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in North-western 
China. Whilst Chinese state propaganda describes its 55 minority groups as living in 
harmony, “the reality stands in stark contrast to the image of national unity conjured by the 
state” Mackerras 2006, p.168). Grievances are said to stem from political, economic and 
social imbalances in the country. Uighur nationalism has been repressed by Chinese state 
authorities, as “any nationalist or independence movements are considered illegitimate 
because China does not recognize the right of national self-determination and adheres strictly 
to a policy of assimilation” (Hyer & Eric, 2006, p. 75).  
In contrast, Russia has a more positive history of ethnic minority protests for 
independence (Gorenburg D. P., 2003, p. 7). Russia has over 130 minority groups3. Russian 
President, Vladimir Putin describes this heterogeneity as a positive, saying “every person and 
every ethnic group has been adding the colors of their own discovered, energy and talent to 
the palette of common culture” (Hays, 2016). Russia had sixteen autonomous republics prior 
to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, including Chechnya which declared independence in 
November 1992 (Storobin, 2004, p. 7). After the formation of the Russian Federation , the 
Russian constitution of 1993 recognised twenty-one “nationality based republics” comprising 
Adygea, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Chechnya, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Gorno-Altay, Ingushetia, 
                                                          
3 A rough breakdown of ethnic groups in Russia is: Russian 77.7 percent, Tatar 3.7 percent, Ukrainian 
1.4 percent, Bashkir 1.1 percent, Chuvash 1 percent, Chechen 1 percent, other 10.2 percent, 
unspecified 3.9 percent (CIA, 2010).  
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Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Karelia, Khakassia, Komi, Mari El, 
Mordovia, North Ossetia, Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan, Tyva (Tuva), and Udmurtia (Hays, 
2016). In addition to these autonomous republics, the Russian constitution also recognises ten 
autonomous regions belonging to ethnic groups. These comprise the Aga Buryat, Chukchi, 
Evenk, Khanty-Mansi, Koryak, Nenets, Permyak, Taymyr, Ust'-Orda Buryat, and Yamalo-
Nenets autonomous regions (Hays, 2016).  
In contrast to China, where ethnic conflict revolves around minorities wanting 
autonomy, ethnic conflicts in Russia arise from these groups trying to gain more power. 
Unlike most states, Russia provides its minorities with autonomy in territory, and recognition 
of their distinct nationalism (Treisman, 1997, p. 212). Putin’s tactic for governing these 
minorities is to use State control, to stop them from fighting each other and threatening 
fundamental Russian state rule (Hays, 2016). Russia has selected the minority leaders since 
2000, as a tactic to maintain control. Most of Russia’s autonomous republics also rely heavily 
on the broader state for economic viability, therefore, Hays (2016) argues that the “threat of 
secession has now been established as a bargaining chip in the struggle with the central 
government for political and economic advantage, but it is a threat of limited practical value”.  
Whilst Russia and China differ in their approach to managing their ethnic minorities, 
neither of them has voluntarily offered and recognised true autonomy and sovereign 
statehood to these groups. It is therefore unlikely that either democratic and non-democratic 
Great Powers will support the secession of non-state nations.  
The international normative regime on secession has changed throughout history. In 
past decades, there have been numerous successful secession attempts, however very few 
have occurred prior to 1990. Since 1990, Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia, the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia broke down into numerous sovereign states that have international recognition, 
East Timor gained independence from Indonesia and South Sudan has separated from Sudan 
(Bennett, 2014, p. 4). Secession was viewed as a “negative right” between 1810 and 1950. 
The international community recognised a state only after it had declared itself as 
independent (Fabry, 2008, p. 52). Balkan states such as Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Romania attained secession in this way. The formation of the United Nations after the Second 
World War, however, changed secession to be a “positive right”, where the question was 
based on whether “an entity had a prior right to independence, rather than whether it is 
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independent” (Fabry, 2008, p. 57). At this point in history, Frabry (2008, p. 29) argues that 
“candidates for recognition (of a right to secession) have been restricted to colonial territories 
whose right to independence was blocked, violated, or not yet realised, to constituent units of 
dissolved states, and to seceding entities that received the consent of their parent states”. 
Unilateral secession, and de facto statehood became illegitimate, and nothing in the United 
Nations Charter provided authorisation for intervention to change this.  
As previously stated, the 1990’s saw an increase in secession attempts, due to a slight 
shift in the international normative regime on secession. Kosovo’s declaration of unilateral 
independence from Serbia in 2008 was an example of this. This secession was and has been 
recognized by numerous western nations, including the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
United States, France and Canada (White R. , 2010). Krauthhammer (1990-1991, p. 23) 
highlights that the unipolarity of the post-Cold War international system that followed the 
end of the 1991 Gulf War led to “a more robust and interventionist US foreign policy”. The 
realist perspective that international norms “serve only an instrumental purpose and are likely 
to be enforced or enforceable only by a hegemon” describes this recent shift (Slaughter, 2006, 
p. 507). This highlights the increased influence of the Great Powers in recent decades and re-
iterates the importance of Great Power backing as a critical requirement for secession.  
The United Nations (UN) Charter along with numerous subsequent documents and 
international institutional frameworks highlight the ideal treatment of minority nations. 
Chapter 1 of the UN Charter was created with the aim in part to “develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “all peoples 
have the right to self-determination”, and “by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United 
Nations, 2018) (Moltchanova, 2009, p. 2). The Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Minorities Declaration) 
that was adopted by the United Nations in 1992 discusses the importance of protecting the 
rights of minority nations, and the importance of these minority groups in international 
relations and state affairs. This document recognises the way in which minority nations 
“contribute to the political and social stability of States in which they live” and, in turn, 
“contribute to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation among peoples and States”. It 
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also notes that “states shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious 
and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage 
conditions for the promotion of that identity”, and that “persons belonging to minorities have 
the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, 
regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, 
in a manner not incompatible with national legislation” (United Nations, 1992). Article four 
identifies the host state’s obligations, in noting that “states shall take measures to create 
favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their 
characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except 
where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international 
standards” (United Nations, 1992).  
Whilst all these provisions sound ideal in theory and highlight the importance of 
minority autonomy, the international community does not frequently practice this attitude. 
Keating (2001, p. 19) argues that there is a requirement for a “new model of the state that 
provides a formula for the recognition of nationality and self‐government in diverse f orms”. 
The way that states respond to their minority groups is diverse and usually not successful in 
managing the self-determination of minority nations. 
The Charter of the United Nations (Chapter 1, Article 1) declares that one of the 
purposes and principles of the UN is to “develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (United Nations, 
1975). In 1970, the UN General Assembly passed a Declaration on Principles of International 
law, which states that “alien subjugation, domination and exploitation to be violations of the 
principle of self-determination and that people denied the right to self-determination may 
exercise the right by choosing independence, integration of free association” (Watson, 2008, 
p. 276). This declaration also notes that all peoples have the right to self-determination 
“without external interference”, and that “every State has the duty to respect this right in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter” (United Nations, 1970). Whilst this provides a 
generalized and idealized perspective, none of these statements are legally enforceable, nor is 
this an accurate reflection of the United Nation’s attitude towards secession in practice.  
Consequential to the international normative regime, it can be argued that secessionist 
groups are more likely to attain independence if they work with the international community 
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to slowly and peacefully attain statehood, rather than boldly declaring themselves as a 
sovereign nation and disturbing the international system and stability of their region 
(Knoblett, 2016, p. 12). Hadji (2009, p. 528) supports this notion through his theory of 
“earned sovereignty”, which is the “conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign 
powers and authority from a state to a sub state entity under international supervision”. This 
contention has, however, been proven inaccurate, in the case of the Kurds and the Kashmiri 
Muslims. Mund (2013) contends that “concerns for international stability by working within 
the international system provides the greater explanatory leverage”.  Montenegro, Kosovo 
and Northern Ireland are examples of states working with the international system (Mund, 
2013) for earned sovereignty, and achieving statehood diplomatically, democratically, and 
under approval of the international community. The counter argument to this perspective is 
that most non-state nation groups do not have the diplomatic relationships with the 
international community. Most scholars agree that “external support for separatist groups is 
often financial, military, or humanitarian aid, but rarely diplomatic in nature” (Knoblett, 
2016, p. 14). As a result of this, secession movements resort to violent uprising to achieve 
their goal of attaining statehood and therefore have no choice but to impact the international 
and geopolitical environment. 
There is no international legal framework on handling the self-determination of non-
state nations, nor is there an international legal framework on secession. Whilst the UN has 
guidelines for the treatment of minorities, UN intervention is still manipulated by the 
international arena and the international normative regime is arguably against secession and 
change. Most political science scholars contend that international norms are predisposed 
towards maintaining the current international system and order. Heraclides’s study (1991, p. 
46) aimed to “establish patterns of interaction between the international system and 
secessionist minorities” and concluded that the international normative regime is generally 
opposed to the emergence of new states, and that neighbouring, and host states historically 
fail to remain neutral. 
The UN has historically intervened in state matters without permission (Makinda, 
1996, p. 149), when enforcement operations are necessary for conflict resolution and security, 
however this is quite rare. The United Nations Security Council is not an appropriate means 
for adjudicating intra-state conflict or secession movements, as it is still limited by the 
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opinions of its members and is therefore inherently biased towards states. Palermo and 
Sabanadze (2011, p. 130) establish the importance of state diversity management as a 
solution that states should adopt for dealing with their minorities, and contend that 
the development and implementation of successful concepts, models, strategies, 
policies and programmes/activities of diversity management should be considered as 
an ongoing process that requires the close, all-encompassing and continuous 
involvement of all relevant social and political as well as economic actors, supported 
by research, education and the media in order to comprehend , consider and reflect on 
the immense complexity and multidimensionality of contemporary societies and the 
interdependence of the relevant actors, factors and processes.  
This diversity management should account for the specific environmental requirements and 
circumstances and be adjusted accordingly. It should consider the general goals and long-
term goals, short term and pointed goals, institutional and organizational frameworks and the 
relevant actors potentially involved. Social, political and economic inclusion is cited to be the 
key element for successful conflict management in plural, multinational societies (Palermo & 
Sabanadze, 2011, p. 139).  
Moral Arguments that Justify Secession by Non-State Nations: 
There is a significant amount of scholarly analysis on the moral implications of secessionist 
movements, and the requirements for a defensible right to secede. These approaches consider 
international and institutional policies and norms, human rights and ethics. Buchanan (1997, 
p. 32) identifies the necessary considerations that should justify the right to secede, through 
two normative questions. The first question is “under what conditions does a group have a 
moral right to secede?” (p. 32). This explores secession rights independently to institutional 
morality, whereas the second question, “under what conditions should a nation be recognized 
as having a right to secede as a matter of international institutional morality, including a 
morally defensible system of international law?” (p. 32). In practicality, secessionist 
movements are bound by international norms and institutional morality, so the second 
question is truly the most pertinent when evaluating the self-determination of non-state 
nations from a moral and ethical perspective. The theoretical analysis of moral justifications 
of secession includes Primary Right theory and Remedial Right theory.   
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Primary Right theory contends that any specific nation has a general right to secede 
unilaterally at will. Harry Beran and Daniel Philpott support this theory. They promulgate 
choice (associative theory) and self-determination (ascriptive theory) to argue that if a non-
state nation has the desire to secede, then it has a moral right to secession. Simplistically, this 
is an extension of the democratic principle that “government requires actual consent of its 
peoples, and that actual consent simply cannot exist where a group wishes to secede” 
(Bennett, 2014, p. 13). Primary Right theory has gained minimal support within academic 
and political circles. It has been criticized due to its lack of recognition surrounding nations’ 
right to territory, along with the lack of consideration given to how the minority nations have 
been treated by the state. If a nation has no justified rights to the territory it demands, and has 
not been treated unjustly, the counter argument is that there is no true claim to secession.  
Remedial Right theory can be utilized to develop an international and institutionally 
comprehensive response to secession justification based on ethical norms and standards 
(Costa, 2003, p. 35). Remedial Right theory contends that secessionist non-sate nations have 
the unilateral right to secede, following: “(a) large-scale and persistent violations of basic 
human rights, (b) the unjust taking of the territory of a legitimate state (where secession is 
simply the taking back of wrongly taken territory, as with the secession of the Baltic 
Republics from the Soviet Union in 1991), and (c) in certain cases, the state's persisting 
violation of agreements to accord a minority group limited self-government within the state” 
(Buchanan A. , Secession, 2013). In the most austere cases, Remedial Right theory would 
state that secession is justified in the event of: “(a), persistent, large-scale violations of basic 
human rights (in the most extreme case, genocide or other mass killings)” (Buchanan A. , 
Secession, 2013). This theory contends that people should have the right to unilateral 
secession from an existing state, if their rights to self-determination are being denied and 
secession is the only remaining option (Vezbergaite, 2011, p. 2). Costa (2003, p. 63) furthers 
this argument by stating that if a minority nation fails to establish a successful multinational 
arrangement, then the non-state nation has a valid right to appeal to secessionist nationalism, 
choice and remedial rights.   
Most political science commentators agree that non-state nations should have an 
internationally recognized and institutionally enforceable right to secede if they meet certain 
conditions. Whilst there is debate around the details of these conditions, it is generally 
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recognised that economic grievance surrounding development, relative deprivation and 
poverty, political factors such as institutions and elites, and geographical factors are all 
critical influences in emerging secessionist claims (Toft, 2012, p. 586). Bennett (2014) 
further argues that there are five fundamental factors that should be analysed in order to 
determine whether a minority group has a justified right to secession; these factors include: 
(1) nationhood and claim to territory; (2) self-determination and autonomy; (3) treatment at 
the hands of the state; (4) viability of the proposed state; and the (5) position of the existing 
state (Bennett, 2014, p. 2).  
In his article “International Law and Morality in the Theory or Secession”, Copp 
(1998, p. 220) highlights the criticality of recognition and legitimacy for secession and seeks 
to map out domestic constitution and international law that ought to be adopted to consolidate 
this. Copp (1998) identifies the requirement for an international legal right of secession and 
concludes that “territorial” and “political” societies have a moral right to secession, which 
should be supported by the international community (219). Copp also contends that political 
and territorial societies should have a recognized right to call a plebiscite on secession, and if 
successful, create a state without international opposition. Whilst numerous scholars (Luke, 
2012) (Copp, 1998) (Radan & Pavkovic, 2013) detail the benefits of an international law 
framework on secession, it is unclear how this would be adopted in practice. These attempts 
fail to address the lack of international viability, as it goes against the international normative 
regime on secession and the general interests of the Great Powers to adopt such a framework.  
As summarized by Heraclides (1991, p. 28), there are six noteworthy arguments 
against the provision of a unilateral right to secession. The first of these arguments is the 
possible onset of Balkanization, domino theory or the phenomenon of a Pandora’s box. 
Second is the fear of indefinite divisibility, as very few states are truly ethically and socially 
homogenous. Third is the impact that such a right could have on democracy as a whole, when 
a minority would have the right to blackmail a state into conformity with its demands through 
the threat of secession. Fourthly, there is a significant danger that such a right would give 
birth to small and non-viable states that would then have to rely intensely on international 
support and resources for survival. The fifth problem is that within a small seceding state, 
there could be further trapped or stranded minorities that would lose their ability to secede in 
turn. Lastly, these stranded minorities could be strategically vital to the original state.  
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State responses to Self-Determination, and Alternatives to Secession: 
The treatment of minority nations by their host states varies significantly from assimilation, 
acculturation, accommodation through primitive autonomy, co-optation, divide and rule, 
discrimination, repression, expulsion, and extermination. Whilst inequality and repression are 
often the key motivations behind why a minority nation strives for autonomy, the dominant 
factor that determines whether a state can assimilate, accommodate or acculturate a minority 
nation is the minority nation’s sense and strength of ethno-nationalism. Heraclides (1991, p. 
8) contends that  ethno-nationalist consciousness is the “independent variable that leads to 
political assertiveness and militant separatism”, regardless of what other factors may have led 
to a minority nation’s self-determination goals. It is this sense and consciousness of ethno-
nationalism that pushes minority nations to aspire for autonomy and independence; however, 
in certain cases these feelings can be curbed, and the minority nation can be integrated into 
the state and wider society through assimilation and acculturation policies. This can be seen 
in Australia, through the way in which the indigenous population had a separate identity and 
culture yet have largely conformed and assimilated with the wider Australian community. 
Assimilation can also be forced through means of co-optation. Small sized minority nations 
can be particularly susceptible to co-optation, as they are vulnerable to selective incentives in 
return for political support (Stone, Whelan, & Murin, 1986, p. 45). The French co-optation of 
the Berbers in Morocco (Byman, 2002, p. 87), despite eventually failing, shows how a state 
can manipulate the allegiance of a minority.  
The approach of “divide and rule” in state politics is a means to manipulate, segregate 
and isolate minority groups to stop them from unifying and challenging state rule. The 
Canadian government segregated its aboriginal population into separate legal definitions, to 
turn the groups into each other so they could be better managed and assimilated (Barth, 2008, 
p. 110). This tactic can also be seen through the way in which Turkey manages its Kurdish 
population. Whilst Turkey did not originally divide the Kurdish minority groups into their 
five geographical locations, it actively prevents its Kurdish population from uniting with 
other Kurdish groups to mitigate a secessionist uprising within its borders.  
Accommodation through primitive autonomy is another means of managing a 
minority nation and is usually conducted through the provision of limited measures of 
cultural autonomy. Cultural autonomy is a way to preserve the positive and substantive rights 
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and entitlements of a minority group. To manage this, a council is usually set up to assume 
responsibility for the educational and cultural affairs of the minority (Reynolds, 2002, p. 
163). These councils are designed to preserve the identity of the group, whilst managing the 
community. An example of this was the case of the Bodo people in India. Cultural autonomy 
was granted through the formation of the Bodo Territorial Council in 2000, “to fulfil 
economic, educational and linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-rights, socio-
cultural and ethnic identity of the Bodos” (SATP, 2003). Cultural autonomy is a limited 
solution when minority nations are involved, as they usually have high expectations 
regarding the level of autonomy they require. 
Forms of federalism provide a slightly more comprehensive solution to autonomy and 
are often adopted by states to manage the demands of minority groups. Lehning et al (1998, 
p. 110) explores federalism as the most commonly cited mechanism for accommodating 
ethno-cultural pluralism, as it allows ethnic groups to remain autonomous and keep their 
cultural identity whilst recognizing the fact that there are economic and political 
interdependencies. For national minorities that have concentration within a specific area or 
territory, federal sub-unit boundaries can be drawn to allow self-government (Lehning, et al., 
1998, p. 119). This allows the group to make key decisions without being outvoted by the 
greater society of the host state. An example of this is the Canadian federal division of 
Quebec, which has an eighty per cent population of Francophone people (Statistics Canada, 
2015). This separate jurisdiction allows control over language, culture, education and 
immigration policy. Whilst federalism is usually the best hope for keeping countries together, 
not all state federal systems are designed for this to be a feasible option long term. It also has 
considerable limitations associated with accommodating national minorities, as there are 
complexities involved in drawing boundaries and sharing power (Lehning, et al., 1998, p. 
120). Federalism is inherently complicated and requires a balance of power and expectation. 
In a lot of cases where the host states attempt federalism, they are not willing to 
accommodate certain aspirations of minority groups, which inevitably end in violent 
secession attempts. 
States that attempt to manage their minority groups through discrimination, 
repression, expulsion, and extermination usually stimulate violent expressions of self-
determination. Whilst this is not exclusive to States that discriminate or repress their minority 
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populations, it is still a frequent response. Extreme examples of state extermination of 
minorities include Nazi Germany’s efforts to exterminate the Jews in the early 1940s and the 
attempt by Rwanda’s Hutu-controlled government to exterminate the rival Tutsis in 1994. 
The Turkish state’s treatment of its Kurdish minority is an example of state oppression. In the 
first fifty years of the Turkish Republic, the Kurds violently protested 29 times just to get 
basic rights such as education in their language, and the authority to give their children 
Kurdish names (Alliance for Kurdish Rights, 2016). The South-Eastern part of Turkey, which 
homes most of the Kurdish population, was consistently deprived of investment and 
economic aid (MIT, 2000). Hannum (2011, p. 458) contends that the key factors that agitate 
non-state nations towards attaining autonomy include language, education, access to 
governmental civil service including police and security forces, social services, land and 
natural resources and representative local government structures. Further to this, Pavkovic 
and Radan (2007, p. 47) contend that the grievances that lead non-state nations towards goals 
of secession are based on three issues. The first of these is the unequal distribution of power 
and resources within the different parts of the host state that is perceived to disadvantage the 
non-state nation. The second is grievances based on harm that is intentionally inflicted by the 
host state against the non-state nation. Lastly, grievances are also based on alien rule or 
domination over the target group. Government repression and exclusion is the primary 
catalyst that propagates the self-determination of minority non-state nations. States that 
repress and actively try to exterminate their minority populations are most often countered 
with violent secession movements, such as the Tamils, the Kosovo Albanian movement and 
the Kurds. Minority groups resort to violence when faced with repression as a last resort to 
achieve autonomy, recognition and secession. Groups that are violently repressed, ignored, 
and actively exterminated generally believe that violence is the only way that can provoke 
change and recognition (Pavkovic & Radan, 2007, p. 59). This is when non-state nations truly 
become a problem within international politics, as these violent uprisings develop into 
secessionist movements that have severe international ramifications.  
Non-state nations that are not managed successfully by their host state usually try to 
secede. Some secession attempts can be peaceful and consensual through a negotiated 
agreement. This occurred when Norway peacefully seceded from Sweden in 1905 (Singapore 
from Malaysia in the 1960s; Slovakia’s velvet divorce from Czechoslovakia). Secession can 
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also be settled mutually through constitutional processes, such as the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s recent decision to support the secession of Quebec (Buchanan A. , 2015). Peaceful 
and consensual secession is however rare, and most cases involve violent revolt. This conflict 
is a serious inter-state, intra-state and international, as “self-determination movements tend to 
be defensive, territorially confined, and limited in scope, the dynamics of bargaining and the 
nature of stakes compel patron states and outside actors to get involved” (Toft, 2012, p. 582) 
and therefore frequently develops into civil war. Violent secessionist movements damage the 
host state through the loss of trade, investment and work, and attract international 
involvement through military aid or outright intervention (Pavkovic & Radan, 2007, p. 58). 
The violence, depending on the scale, usually results in human rights violations, refugees, 
international concern and intervention. In terms of cost to the host state, violent secessionist 
movements are second only to a war or prolonged conflict with another state entity. Siroky 
(2009, p. 276) finds that even if a non-state nation achieves secession, there is an 87 percent 
chance of further violence and ethnic conflict, which backs his contention that secession is 
not an adequate solution to ethnic conflict and the problem of non-state nations in 
international relations.  
Non-state nations have been an inherent problem in international relations and will 
continue to be a cause of conflict within the international system. In the world of multi-
national states, there are numerous minority groups with collective identities that are 
classified as non-state nations. In the past few decades, numerous ethno-separatist 
movements have attempted to challenge the pre-existing world order of nation-states in order 
to redefine national boundaries for the creation of new, independent states. These national 
minority groups will continue to strive for self-determination and autonomy, especially if 
their rights are being limited or repressed by their host states. It has been established that 
states often fail to manage the diversity of their people, which then leads to secession 
movements and conflict that has severe ramifications for human rights, geopolitics and 
international relations.  
Summary 
There are key endogenous and exogenous factors that usually determine the success and/or 
failure for non-state nations in secessionist conflicts. Firstly, the non-state nation must have a 
claim to territory and a territorial base for collectivity, often underpinned by a sense of 
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nationalism. Secondly, the non-state nation must have autonomous nationalism, culture and a 
common identity, along with the common political goal for independence. This requires 
internal cohesion and organisation to ensure the collective goal of self-determination and 
autonomy. Thirdly, the non-state nation must have attempted to gain recognition of that 
independence by other states and international organisations, as international support and 
recognition of autonomy and sovereign statehood is a critical factor for secession. This 
support includes the official recognition of its independence by other independent states and 
international organisations such as the European Union. Fundamentally, as the international 
normative regime on secession is heavily biased in favour of the State, it is imperative that 
non-state nations attain international support to back their claim for autonomy. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has explored the concept of nationalism, and how it underpins the identity and 
self-determination of non-state nations. It has also discussed the organisation of nations, 
states, and multinational states and the place of non-state nations within these constructs. The 
issues that arise from the existence of non-state nations within international relations have 
been identified, including the way in which host States manage their minority populations. 
This in turn often drives minority nations towards violent forms of self-determination, in an 
attempt to secede. This chapter has explored the international normative regime on secession 
and how this has historically shaped the outcome of minority secession movements. It has 
also touched on moral and theoretical perspectives on secession, and alternative means for 
autonomy. Lastly, this chapter has framed key endogenous and exogenous factors that usually 
determine the success and/or failure for non-state nations in secessionist conflicts, which will 
be used as a theoretical baseline for discussion throughout this thesis. The subsequent chapter 
will explore Kurdish history, nationhood and the desire for Kurdistan which will develop a 





Chapter 2: The Kurds: History, Nationhood and the Desire for Kurdistan 
 
Introduction: 
This chapter provides a summary of Kurdish history, to detail how they have arrived at their 
current divided state due to centuries of internal schisms and misalignments in leadership, 
direction and self-determination goals.  
This analysis will empirically demonstrate the central hypothesis of this thesis, that non-state 
nations such as the Kurds find it very hard to establish a sovereign national state through 
secession because of endogenous and exogenous factors. The main endogenous factor is the 
lack of unity among the group (exacerbated by the fact that they are divided across several 
states), which leads to the creation of separate cultural and historical narratives, political and 
ideological divisions and competing and conflicting objectives. 
This chapter will explore who the Kurdish people are, and the history behind how they came 
to be divided across several countries in the modern Middle East. The history of each of these 
Kurdish contingents will be explored, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Whilst all 
Kurdish communities have experienced forced assimilation and repression from their host 
states, the severity and outcomes of this experience has varied across the various states. Each 
of these contingents have their own unique history which has formed key differences in 
culture and perspectives on nationalism. This chapter will explore what these differences are, 
and how they may have prevented the emergence of a homogeneous and cohesive Kurdish 
nationalist movement based on a monolithic culture. It will also demonstrate why some 
Kurdish contingents are fighting hard for self-determination and autonomy, whilst others are 
relatively passive in comparison.  
Kurdish History: 
The Kurds are an indigenous people from the Mesopotamian plains and highlands, which 
now form north-eastern Syria, northern Iraq, north-eastern Iran, south-eastern Turkey and 
south-western Armenia (BBC, 2016). The World Directory of Minorities (Minority Rights 
Group, 1997) cites a Kurdish population within Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Germany, 
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Sweden, Syria, Turkey and the U.S.A; however, some of these 
population concentrations are negligible. For thousands of years, the Kurds have been 
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concentrated in the mountainous region, colloquially named as “Kurdistan”. This area 
comprises Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nezan, 2017, p. 56). With a 
total population of 35 million, approximately 12 million reside in Turkey, with a further 6 
million in Iraq, 6 million in Iran, 2 million in Syria and the remaining located in near regions 
(CIA, 2014).  
The Kurdish people are believed to be derived from the Indo-European race, from 
prehistoric kingdoms called the Mitanni, Kassites and Hourites that lived in the mountains 
between the Euphrates and the Iranian plateau (Nezan, 2017). This community later reigned 
over Assyria and Iran from 612 BC, which is cited as “the first Kurdish year” by nationalists 
(Nezan, 2017). The Kurdish region of Iran was recognised since ancient times. Most of 
‘Kurdistan’ was part of the Iranian Empire until this was divided during the Ottoman Empire 
conflicts to form modern day Turkey, Syria and Iraq (Hale, 2014). For centuries, the Kurds 
had a nomadic existence, until the seventeenth century which saw the division of Kurdistan 
between the Persian and Ottoman empires, and agreed borders defined in 1639 (Hassanpour, 
2015). This struggle began in 1508 when the rulers of Persia and the Ottoman Empire first 
started to contest control over Kurdistan. The Persians wanted control over the region’s 
agricultural wealth, and wished to “marginalize the Kurdish Sunni Muslim decision-makers 
who were objecting to the expansion of the Persian Shia’ism to control the Shia holy cities of 
Najaf and Karbala in the Mesopotamian plain; present-day Iraq” (Kakeyi, 2010). The 
Ottomans too wanted access to Kurdistan for economic gain; however, in contrast they 
supported the Sunni population within Kurdistan in order to counter the Persian Shia 
expansion.  
Decades of struggle and violence finally amounted to both the Turkish and the 
Persians admitting defeat and agreeing borders through the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639 (White 
B. T., 2011, p. 42). This border split the Kurds into two groups, one under the Ottoman 
Empire and the other under the Persian Empire.  These two Kurdish groups were not without 
conflict for long. Kurdish leaders led numerous revolts against both the Ottoman and Persian 
empires. When the Persian empire began to decline, Karim Khani Zand who was the founder 
of the Kurdish Zand Dynasty in Persia, attacked and occupied the Vilayet of Basra in 1775. 
This was to disrupt the Ottoman Empire’s access to the Persian Gulf and to interrupt their 
economic growth (Kakeyi, 2010). This occupation ceased in 1821 when another war in 
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Northeastern Kurdistan erupted between the two empires. This conflict finally resulted in the 
Treaty of Erzurum in 1823, which dictated: 
From this period, on the side of Baghdad and Kurdistan no interference is to take 
place, nor with any Districts of the Divisions of Kurdistan within the boundaries, is 
the Persian government to intermeddle, or authorize any acts of molestation, or to 
assume any authority over the present or former possessors of those countries” 
(Bahadori, 2005, p. 7).  
Despite this provision, both empires continued their involvement in each other’s 
Kurdish affairs. International mediation from Britain, Turkish and Russian diplomats tried to 
diffuse the situation. Whilst these international stakeholders assisted in resolving this conflict 
to further their own economic goals within the region, their resolution strategies maintained 
Kurdish division and repression.  
The late 1940s and 1950s brought political upheaval to the Middle East, which caused 
significant changes to Kurdish society as a result of land reforms and civil war. This was 
initiated in 1948 by a revolt in the Arbat village  which was “the first uprising of its kind in 
the Iraqi countryside -- an uprising against the landed sheikh instead of under his leadership -
- and in this sense set the tone for the fervid, if intermittent, agrarian unrest of the 1950s” 
(Batatu, 1982). This conflict introduced a new social strata and Kurdish working class, which 
increased skills, education and encouraged the Kurdish population to be further integrated 
within the wider community  (Hassanpour, 2015). Instead of integrating into the community, 
this newfound education and awareness motivated an increase in Kurdish consciousness. This 
dramatically transformed Kurdish nationalism, and arguably marks the beginning of the 
Kurdish struggle for autonomy and recognition.  
Whilst the Kurds existed as an identifiable group for more than two thousand years, 
the Kurdish people only truly attained a sense of community in the twentieth century 
(McDowall, 2007, p. 1). There are various arguments surrounding what constitutes 
nationhood, community and collectivity. Some scholars contend that the “essence of a nation 
is intangible” and that it is a psychological bond that differentiates a nation from others 
(Walker, 1978, p. 379). Walker (1978, p. 379) cites the dictionary of International Relations 
which defines a nation as “a social group which shares a common ideology, common 
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institutions and customs and a sense of homogeneity”. As this definition alone does not 
clearly differentiate a religious sect from a nation, it is argued that nations also have a sense 
of belonging or connection to territory (Geertz, 1997, p. 236). Other scholars and definitions 
argue that essential characteristics of a nation include institutions, rights, language, mutual 
culture and a civic ideology within a common homeland (McDowall, 2007, p. 2). Kurdish 
ancestry, language, religion and culture is dissimilar between different Kurdish contingents.  
As a people, the Kurds did not derive from an ethnically coherent background of 
common ancestry (McDowall, 2007, p. 8). Each Kurdish contingent has differing historical 
roots, and therefore “the difficulty of resolving the Kurdish ethno-nationalism reflects the 
complex nature of the multiple identities of the Kurds with regard to language, regionalism, 
and tribal ties.” (Yavus, 2007, p. 16). The Kurds descended from various tribal groups over 
time. Investigations into the physiognomy of the Kurds contend that some of their most 
significant physical features bear a strong similarity with neighbouring non-Kurdish 
communities (McDowall, 2007, p. 9). Language is also an indicator of their diverse origins. 
Kurdish language belongs to the Irano-Aryan of the Indo-European language family and has 
developed through the assimilation of tribal dialects (Blau, 2016). There are two major 
contemporary dialects of Kurdish language; Kurmanji and Surani which are “standardised 
versions” of a variety of tribal dialects. Kurmanji is spoken by Northern Kurdish contingents 
in Turkey, Syria and some in Iraq and Iran whilst Surani is spoken by Kurds in Southern 
regions in Iraq and Iran (McDowall, 2007, p. 9). The third Kurdish language is one spoken by 
the Kurdish “intellectual elite”, who are literate in Arabic, Turkish and Persian (Blau, 2016). 
These languages influenced the Kurdish dialect.  
The dominance of Kurdish tribal leadership has been a key downfall for Kurdish 
aspirations of statehood. It is an undemocratic, authoritarian style of leadership which has 
caused significant conflict within the Kurdish population. Dawoody (2006, p. 487) highlights 
how a simple analysis of “Kurdish leadership and the actions of their main political parties, 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), reveals 
how they seek to advance their agendas with undemocratic methods”, through the control of 
“Kurdish media, political dynamics, elections, and appointments to administrative positions 
within the Kurdish region”. This form of leadership bans the formation of other Kurdish 
political parties and restricts political freedoms. It has been a dominant cause of internal 
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conflict for the Kurds throughout history. Many leaders have also been seen to be corrupt and 
focused on pursuing their interests over those of the Kurdish people. Many believe that 
Kurdish disunity is promulgated by their corrupt leadership  (Abdul-Qahar, 2017), which has 
caused intra-Kurdish conflict and violence for centuries. This corruption and lack of 
inspirational leadership has also suppressed the chances of Kurdish unity, which is important 
for them to fight in accord for autonomy.  
Kurdish nationalism propagates the concept of Kurdish unity and cohesion. 
According to Amir Hassanpour, “nationalists in Kurdistan as elsewhere in the world envision 
their people as a linguistically, culturally, ideologically and politically united entity” 
(Hassanpour, 2015); however, each Kurdish contingent maintains different cultural, religious, 
political and ideological principles. Whilst the Kurds are divided geographically, each 
contingent remains to fight for the same goal of autonomy and recognition. They are broadly 
united by two goals. The first is to rise above the violence and oppression that is imposed on 
them by their host states, and the second is to achieve sovereign statehood (Ozsoy, 2013, p. 
104).  
Kurdish nationalism has emerged and developed as a by-product of the political 
environment of each host state. A host state’s policies strongly influence Kurdish identity and 
ethno-nationalism, and it can therefore be argued that Turkey’s statehood and structure has 
influenced the Kurdish evolution as a non-state nation. Yavus (2001) contends that “the 
major reason for the politicization of Kurdish cultural identity is the shift from multi-ethnic, 
multi-cultural realities of the Ottoman empire to the nation-state model.” Turkey has 
provided the Kurds with an urban and centralised community and education facilities which 
in turn has strengthened Kurdish identity. Natali (2005, p. 2) describes this combination as a 
“highly ethnicized, illegal, diversified, urban-based nationalist movement whereby tribal 
leaders played no significant role as the nationalist elite”. The political arena in Iraq has 
strengthened Kurdish tribal communities, which has developed a strong Kurdish ethnic 
nationalist movement which is arguably fractured between the neighbouring Arab-Iraqi 
identities. The ambiguous political arena of Iran has strengthened the inclusivity for Kurdish 
and Shi’a groups, which has resulted in a “secular, left-leaning Sunni Kurdish community” 
which is characterised by violence and compromise (Natali, The Kurds And the State: 
Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, And Iran, 2005, p. 2).  
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A history of Kurdish divide 
Whilst once united by territory and culture, the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire has 
divided the Kurds in a way that extends further than just geographical location. The history of 
the Kurdish people after the early 1920s has been one of fractured homeland, political 
repression, and the emergence of diverse cultural, religious, political and ideological 
principles. These form the endogenous divisions which fundamentally hamper Kurdish unity 
and direction for self-determination goals.  
 
Turkey, and the Kurds: 
Turkey is the home of the largest Kurdish population in the world, with an estimated 
population of 10 to 20 million Kurds. Despite this significant presence, the Kurds have 
historically been forced to assimilate, and have not been provided the recognition and 
autonomy that they so desperately seek. In Turkey, Kurdish nationalism is still deemed 
synonymous with separatism, and is a punishable offense (FAS, 2017). In 1979, the US 
Central Intelligence Agency published a statement that highlighted the prevalence of Kurdish 
separatism in Turkey, stating: 
 
The Kurds’ sense of separate identity has not been significantly reduced by the 
[Turkish] government’s attempts to co-opt or supress them. The Kurdish language has 
flourished, and clandestinely published Kurdish literatures is surreptitiously 
obtainable in Kurdish areas .… In the past several year, several overt “cultural 
associations” and covert liberation groups have formed to promote the idea of Kurdish 
autonomy and independence (CIA, 1979).  
 
Up until the early 1990’s, it was illegal in Turkey to use the word “Kurd” to describe 
an ethnic group (Dixon & Ergin, 2010, p. 1330), and the Turkish constitution defined all 
citizens as Turkish, with no recognition of minority groups. The Kurdish language and any 
forms of Kurdish nationalist expression were strictly banned. The Turkish strategy for 
managing its  Kurdish population therefore centred on  strategic denial and suppression while 
ignoring the existence of the Kurds and hoping to ‘sweep them under the carpet’ through 
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assimilation policies. Despite this, a community of nationalist Kurdish elite maintained an 
underground presence, which started to surface in the form of political protest.   
The 1960s marked another key milestone of Kurdish self-determination, when the 
Kurdish population attempted to raise their concerns through the democratic system (Gunes, 
2012, p. 1). These demands were repressed by the Turkish government, which led to the 
Kurds pursuing more extreme avenues of demonstrating their discontent. One of the main 
forms of protest was the formation of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party. The Kurdistan Worker’s 
Party, often known by the acronym of its Kurdish name Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), 
is a political party that was established  in the 1970s mainly to advocate for Kurdish 
autonomy through violent military means in the face of state repression of the Kurds  (Bruno, 
2007). Gradually, it established a firm foothold in southern and eastern Turkey and across the 
border in northern Iraq. The PKK has been termed as a terrorist organization by most 
Western States since it frequently uses  violent tactics such as suicide bombings, attacks on 
civilians and vandalism of public property (Bruno, 2007). The PKK is motivated by rising 
discontent within the Kurdish communities, especially in Turkey, in their ongoing battle for 
recognition and autonomy. Honneth (1995, p. 169) attributes this violent response to 
repression, stating that “the denial of recognition provides the motivational and justificatory 
basis for social struggles”. The PKK is arguably one of the core driving forces of Kurdish 
nationalism and identity. Yavus (2007, p. 11) highlights that the PKK was influential in 
furthering Kurdish nationalist identity, through “establishing a web of networks in and 
outside Turkey to recruit militants, undermining the religio-tribal structure of the region by 
presenting new opportunities for the middle class and urbanized Kurdish youth, and 
unexpectedly popularizing and consolidating Turkish nationalism in Turkey”. The PKK has 
deepened Kurdish politicisation, legitimised and strengthened Kurdish identity and bolstered 
internal cohesion which are fundamental requirements for independence.  
Kurdish identity politics and recognition gained further traction from 2002 (Kazu, 
2016, p. 123). Turkey’s possible inclusion in the European Union (EU) catalysed this 
momentum, as in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria which mandated the respectful 
treatment of minority groups, Turkey was pressured to increase the civil liberties of its 
Kurdish population (Dixon & Ergin, 2010, p. 1329). From 2001 to 2004, Turkey passed some 
reforms that loosened the bans on Kurdish linguistic and cultural expression and abolished 
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the ‘state of emergency rule’ in Kurdish provinces (Ozsoy, 2013, p. 107). These changes 
made headway for recognising the individual rights of the Kurdish people; however, the state 
maintained the uncompromising and strict laws surrounding collective rights and political 
sovereignty which remains the central issue for the Turkish Kurds.  
In recent years, political and violent resistance has increased between the Kurds and 
the Turkish government. The Kurds legal and political strategy has evolved with the 
formation of the People’s Labour Party (HEP) and many other autonomous professional 
organisations, NGO’s, institutions and unions. This has diversified the Kurdish national 
movement, from the guerrilla warfare and violence of the PKK through to strategic political 
ventures and activism. Although radio and television broadcasting in the Kurdish language 
was legalised in 2009 and in 2012 the Kurdish language was finally approved to be taught in 
public schools, these freedoms have been inconsistent. According to Ozsoy (2013, p. 108), 
since 2008 over “8000 Kurdish politicians and activists have been put in jail, including 
parliamentarians, mayors, journalists, lawyers, intellectuals, trade unionists, teachers, 
students, children, and many others”. In December 2016, Turkey instigated a significant 
crackdown on Kurdish news and media outlets, politicians and schools which shutdown 
hundreds of businesses and jailed thousands with minimal cause (Nordland, 2016).   
 
The emerging “Kurdish reality”, through regional developments in the Middle East is 
reframing the way the Turkish government sees the Kurds. In recent years, Turkey has 
fostered a relationship with the Iraqi Kurds through the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG), the Peshmerga forces and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) which is the main 
Iraqi Kurdish Party led by Massoud Barzani. But Turkey remains hostile towards the Syrian 
Kurds, particularly the Democratic Unity Party (PYD) and People’s Protection Units (YPG), 
which is a Syrian armed force that supports the PYD. Turkey also continues to actively fight 
its own Turkish Kurds, with frequent armed conflicts against the PKK. Despite Turkey’s 
stance on each of these Kurdish factions, the Kurds are a key regional stakeholder, especially 
in Syria, Iraq and Iran, attracting international attention and support for the fight against 
Islamic extremist groups such as Islamic State. Turkey has condemned terrorist organisations 
including Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, and formed alliances aimed at fostering peace in the 
Middle East. Despite this, many Turkish airstrikes in the Middle East have resulted in 
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Kurdish casualties. The Kurds have frequently accused the Turkish government of using the 
US-led coalition against the Islamic State as a cover to attack the PKK in Turkey and Iraq as 
well as the YPG in northern Syria (BBC, 2016). It could be argued that Turkey is concerned 
about its Kurdish population gaining momentum and power considering the developments in 
the Middle East, which could strengthen the Turkish Kurds’ desire and capability to secede 
from Turkey. Despite Turkey’s concerns that its Kurdish contingent might attempt to secede 
and set up their own independent state within Turkey, the PKK’s leader Cemil Bayik stated 
that their aim is not to separate from Turkey and attain statehood. Rather Bavik confirmed 
that “we want to live within the borders of Turkey on our own land freely... The struggle will 
continue until the Kurds' innate rights are accepted" (BBC, 2016). 
Iraq, and the Kurds: 
The Kurdish people have had a presence in the territory of modern-day Iraq for 
centuries. Since the establishment of the contemporary state of Iraq in October 1932 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018), the Kurdish presence has been characterised by genocide, 
violence, repression and underdevelopment. The genocidal attacks on the “Kurdistan region” 
of Norther Iraq intensified in the 1970’s, when the Iraqi state tried to suppress and undermine 
the establishment of Kurdish autonomy. One of these attacks, code named ‘Al-Anfal’, was 
led by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hasan Al-Majid, in 1988. This campaign 
used chemical and biological weapons in an effort to rid Iraq of Kurdish males of fighting 
ages; the attack also resulted in the destruction of over 4,000 Kurdish villages and deaths of  
300,000 Kurdish civilians  (O'Leary, 2002, p. 18). 
 
In 1991, the Kurds led an uprising against the Iraqi state. The uprising led to an 
international military intervention, which pushed out Iraqi forces from northern Iraq and 
created an autonomous enclave under Kurdish control. This territory came to be governed by 
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and was recognized as an autonomous region by 
the Iraqi constitution in 2005 (CNN, 2017). Approximately 3.7 million Kurdish people live in 
the Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Iraq (O'Leary, 2002, p. 18); another 2 million 




The U.S led coalition and fight against terrorist forces assisted the Iraqi Kurds in 
achieving partial autonomy. The post-Saddam Hussein era allowed the Kurds to emerge 
equal with the Iraqi Arabs and provided an opportunity to establish their Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) and build their Peshmerga forces (Katzmann, 2009, p. 2). The Iraqi 
Government has progressed in the past two decades and has established federalism and a 
constitution that recognises three Kurdish provinces; Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah. From 
the KRG, two main political parties have risen to lead the new generation of Kurds in Iraq 
and to  establish a de-facto quasi-independent Kurdish ‘state’  (Aziz, 2011, p. 3). These 
parties are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK). From 2005, the Iraqi Kurds have voted in Iraqi elections; however, despite U.S. 
mediation in 2009, strong tensions exist between the Iraqi Arabs and the Iraqi Kurds. These 
tensions are fuelled by the enduring issue of Kurdish independence, which is a concern for 
Baghdad as well as for neighbouring states such as Turkey with a significant Kurdish 
minority. From 2007 onwards, the Turkish government has launched several military 
operations against the Iraqi Kurds, including air strikes, bombings and even ground attacks  
(Sanchez, 2017).  
 
The violence and confusion in recent years that has ensued from the rise of Islamic 
State has both divided and united the Iraqi Arabs and the Iraqi Kurdish people. In 2014, the 
KRG and the Iraqi government signed an agreement to share oil revenues and military 
supplies (BBC, 2016). In a united effort to fight the Islamic State, the Iraqi government 
agreed to pay the salaries of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and deliver weaponry to the Kurds 
from the United States. In return, the Kurds agreed to deliver oil to the Iraqi government and 
to share the oil revenues. However, the implementation of these agreements have generated 
considerable friction between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government. Matters came to a 
head in 2014 when the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blocked the transfer of funds that 
were due to the KRG, which meant that the KRG  could not pay the salaries of government 
officials and the Peshmerga fighters. This sparked a backlash from the Kurds. The KRG 
stopped the shipments of oil to the Iraqi government and instead started selling oil directly in 
the international market  (Demirtaş, 2014). Baghdad retaliated militarily by re-exerting 
control over the northern oil-rich town of Kirkuk, which many Iraqi Kurds regard as the 
44 
 
capital of a future Kurdish state. Despite these issues, however, fighting the Islamic State has 
been the enduring priority of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Kurds in recent years.  
 
Most scholars argue that the Iraqi Kurds are political realists and do not wish to 
secede from Iraq and gain sovereign statehood. Rather,  “their goal is to share in the 
establishment of a viable regional government for Iraqi Kurdistan in a unified Iraq under a 
federal system, with a governing document that provides written principles concerning 
structures and rules for governance and appropriation of federal funds” (O'Leary, 2002, p. 
24). This sentiment has been publicly shared by leaders of the KRG; however, the sentiment 
may not be supported by the wider Iraqi Kurdish population.  
 
In recent years, many Kurds have begun to challenge the PUK-KDP coalition 
government in the KRG. For instance, the newly formed (in 2009 by Peshmerga veterans) 
Gorran Movement (meaning  movement for “change”  in Kurdish),  (The Kurdish Project, 
2015) has accused  the PUK-KDP coalition government of corruption  and criticised the  
leaders of the KDP and the PUK  of “mixing policies with business in the interest of their 
own families, relatives and cronies rather than their constituencies” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 110). 
The Gorran Movement has further accused the coalition government of misappropriating 
public funds and mismanaging government resources. 
  
The Gorran Movement has become the second most popular party in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
gaining the support of disenfranchised and disillusioned PUK supporters. Its rise has led to 
tensions and conflict with the more established Kurdish political parties such as the PUK and 
the KDP. For instance, in (give the year) over 3,000 Gorran Movement demonstrators 
protested in the streets of Sulaimaniya against the KDP. These protestors demanded an end to 
corruption and threw rocks at KDP buildings. In response, the KDP supporters set fire to the 
headquarters of the Gorran Movement, furthering internal tensions between the Kurdish 






Syria, and the Kurds: 
It is estimated that the Kurds (around 1.7 million) account for approximately ten percent of 
the population in Syria (CIA, 2017). The Kurdish region in Syria, known as Rojava, has three 
provinces: Afrin Canton (West), Kobane Canton (middle) and Cizre Canton (East) (The 
Kurdish Project, 2015). Like the Iraqi Kurds, the Syrian Kurds have been met with cultural, 
political and economic repression due to fears that their nationalism and quest for autonomy 
might undermine the Syrian state (Lowe, 2006, p. 2). Attacks aimed at limiting the Syrian 
Kurds began in the 1930’s. These attacks increased in intensity through the mid-1950s, when 
“Kurdish customs and symbols were attacked, the Kurmanji language was banned from 
public use and Kurdish music and publications were forbidden. Any opposition activity in 
Syria has always been extremely difficult and the nascent Kurdish political movement was 
shattered very quickly as Kurdish parties were banned and its leaders and members arrested 
and imprisoned" (Lowe, 2006, p. 14). The Syrian Arab population was encouraged to relocate 
to Kurdish areas, to force assimilation of Syrian Kurds into Syrian Arab culture and to lessen 
the potential threat of Kurdish independence (Fragiskatos, 2007, p. 110).  
The Democratic Union Party (PYD), an associate of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK) in Turkey, is the leading political movement in the Kurdish region of Syria. It has over 
80,000 members and leads the fight against both the Syrian government and the Islamic State 
(The Kurdish Project, 2015). Second to the PYD is the Kurdish National Council (KNC), 
which governs a coalition of over 15 Kurdish political movements that are fighting for 
Kurdish autonomy in Syria. The KNC emerged in the late 1980’s, supported by Massoud 
Barzani, the leader of the KRG in Iraq (Pike, 2016). The KNC have often clashed with the 
PYG, especially concerning strategy for combatting the Islamic State.  
Syrian Kurdish forces have maintained control of the areas they have occupied since 
the Syrian government troops retreated from these areas in 2015 (The Kurdish Project, 2015). 
In March 2016, the Syrian Kurds declared a region of North-Eastern Syria (Rojava) to be 
fully autonomous, which raised concerns from the Turkish and Syrian governments.  The 
Syrian Kurds, however, pointed out that the declaration of autonomy in Rojava was not 
intended to divide Syria but to restore balance. A Syrian Kurdish spokesperson articulated 
this objective succinctly:  “the creation of a federal and democratic system shall take place 
within a sovereign Syria...we don’t support the partition of Syria. ... At the same time, we 
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don’t accept centralization,” but wish to achieve “a democratic Syria that protects the 
autonomy and freedom of every community” (Sheppard, 2016). The ‘foreign minister’ of 
Rojava further confirmed that the Syrian Kurds only wished to strengthen federalism in Syria 
and hoped that “ that in the future Syria can declare [a] confederation with other countries 
because in our project we want to open borders to all the world, not create new 
borders” (Sheppard, 2016). He also noted that “we think our system of democratic self-
administration would be a good model for all of Syria. We think this is the solution.” Whilst 
there is talk of the U.S and even Russia potentially supporting this autonomy, the response 
from neighbouring states such as Turkey, Iran and Iraq would be swift in repressing this, to 
ensure it doesn’t inspire revolt from their Kurdish minorities. 
Iran, and the Kurds: 
There has been a Kurdish presence in North-West Iran dating back to the 7th Century. . This 
region is often referred to as Rojhelat, and includes  the West Azerbaijan Province, the 
Kordestan Province, and the Kermanshah Province. This region shares its borders with 
Turkey and Iraqi ‘Kurdistan’. The region is home to approximately 8 million Kurds, which 
make up 15 percent of Iran’s population (Yildiz & Taysi, 2007, p. 2).  
The Iranian government has refused to accommodate the Kurds as a minority group. 
Since as early as the sixteenth century, the government of Iran has suppressed Kurdish tribal 
groups to ensure they did not attain power or autonomy. Under the 1979 Iranian Constitution 
that grants minority rights, the Kurds in Iran are still a repressed minority, with negligible 
recognition. The Iranian government maintains that Iranian Kurds  have equal rights; 
however, the Kurds are banned from leadership roles, Kurdish organisations are restricted, 
the Kurdish language is not allowed to be taught in  schools and Kurdish people are regularly 
imprisoned and killed for voicing separatist opinions (Yildiz & Taysi, 2007, p. 32).  
The most prominent political and nationalist group in Rojhelat is the Democratic 
Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), which was formed in early 1945 and has been fighting for 
Kurdish rights in Iran for over 70 years. Other Iranian Kurdish political organisations include 
the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) and Komala. 
The PDKI describe the life of Kurds in Iran as one of “militarization” with “oppressive, 
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suppressive, marginalizing, exclusionary policies and practices along with state-sponsored 
and state-sanctioned discrimination, denial and violence” (Frantzman, 2017). 
In recent years, however, the tensions between Iran and Rojhelat have simmered in 
the back burner, distracted by the common goal of fighting the Islamic State. The Iranian 
government have assisted their Kurdish population, by providing weapons and training to the 
Peshmerga. While this support will most likely eventuate in strengthening the Kurds as a 
minority, the Iranian government is fostering their alliance with the Kurds to mitigate the 
expansion of Islamic State power within the region. It is yet to be seen as to whether the 
Iranian-Kurdish alliance will endure past combatting the Islamic State. If it did, it could 
potentially have far reaching influence within Iraq, Syria and Turkey.  
 
Azerbaijan, and the Kurds 
There is a very small Kurdish population that reside in the republic of Azerbaijan, 
estimated to be between 13,000 and 20,000 people (The State Statistical Committee of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, 2012). A small population of Kurds were said to have immigrated to 
Azerbaijan in 1589, after the Ottoman-Safavid War (Kreyenbroek & Sperl, 2005, p. 163). 
Most of this population either assimilated or moved to Armenia in the 1920s. Most of the 
Kurds lived in an area between Nagorno Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian border, which 
was briefly a Kurdish Autonomous province between 1923 and 1929 called ‘Red Kurdistan’ 
however this was short-lived, and that community was soon dispersed in the broader 
Azerbaijan population.  
Azerbaijan has a close alliance with Turkey. This has had an overall negative impact 
on the Kurdish minority. Whilst they haven’t been violently oppressed, like other Kurdish 
communities in other states, up to recently in 2001, 32 Kurds were arrested in Azerbaijan 
(Minority Rights Group, 2018). This was because the government was supporting Turkey in 
its suspicions that these individuals were a member of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 
(Minority Rights Group, 2018). Furth to this, the Azerbaijani government supported Turkey 
in condemning the Iraqi Kurdish referendum in September 2017, demonstrating their 




Armenia, and the Kurds 
The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority group in Armenia, with a population of 
approximately 40,000. This figure was almost double during the Soviet Era and comprises 
predominantly Yezidi Kurds which are culturally distinct as they practice their own religion. 
This religion has elements from Islamic, Zoroastrian and Christian religious and is based on a 
‘Peacock God’ deity, Melek Taus (Minority Rights, 2018).  
The Yezidi Kurds have historically expressed unfair treatment under the Armenian 
government. Grievances include concerns about ‘inadequate representation of the Kurdish 
minority at national and local levels’, ‘lower levels of education than other communities’ and 
receiving ‘disproportionate hazing during military service compared to other ethnic groups in 
Armenia’ (Minority Rights, 2018). Many Yezidi Kurds have since migrated to Russia and 
Germany, seeking better treatment (Maisel, 2018, p. 45). The population which remains in 
Armenia are relatively submissive, and live nomadic lifestyles free of violence and protest.  
Conclusion 
Whilst each Kurdish community has experienced violence and repression from their host 
states, their experiences and resultant diversity in culture, ideology and political views have 
been distinct. The degree of repression by the host state, on their Kurdish community has also 
shaped each contingent and catalysed the degree of desperation for self-determination. Host 
states such as Iraq, Iran and Syria have consistently broken human rights standards, and 
violently repressed their Kurdish minorities. In contrast however, Kurdish communities in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia were not met with violence and were merely assimilated by the host 
states.  
Kurdish leadership maintains a tribal nature and has been often corrupt; promulgating 
the interests of select few rather than the populace as a whole. This leadership type is not 
conducive to true unity, or legitimate secession. Great Powers such as the U.S, U.K, Germany 
etc have traditionally only supported and rewarded democratic approaches to self-
determination and have condemned groups that use violence and coercion. While Great 
Powers such as China and Russia have a history of condoning authoritarian type leadership 
styles, as it can be argued that they display these characteristics themselves, it is unlikely that 
they will support the plight of the Kurds unless it serves a larger purpose for them. Kurdish 
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leadership has therefore consistently fractured cohesion with the community and has hindered 
chances at achieving international support. 
This chapter has discussed the history of the Kurdish people and provided detailed historical 
understanding of who they are and how they have come to be the non-state nation vying for 
independence that they are today. Each major Kurdish geographical population has been 
explored to highlight key historical events and to explain the recent state of affairs. This 
historical detail provides the backdrop for Chapter 3 and 4, and critically explains the 







Chapter 3: Kurdish Struggles for an Independent Kurdistan in the 20th Century 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore the secessionist attempts made by the Kurds to achieve a Kurdish 
state throughout the 20th Century. These ‘episodes’ have all been opportunities or ‘windows’, 
where the Kurds had a chance at secession, and achieving sovereign statehood. The key 
reasons for failure will be explored. These include the significant internal divisions within the 
Kurds that prevented a unified secessionist political movement for an independent Kurdistan 
from emerging and being sustained over a period of time; inability of the Kurds to militarily 
overpower the forces of the host states that were opposed to Kurdish secession and 
independent statehood; and lack of support from the Major Powers and key international 
organizations for Kurdish independence and the establishment of an independent Kurdistan 
state. These repeat failures have gradually weakened Kurdish nationalism and resolve for 
independent statehood. This chapter will also discuss these reasons for failure, in context of 
the theory detailed in chapter one.  
The First Attempt 
The first significant opportunity for Kurdish statehood emerged after the break down of the 
Ottoman Empire during 1918 to 1920, when the British attempted to establish a Kurdish state 
in the area of Northern Iraq and South-East Turkey (The Kurdish Project, 2016). The post-
World War I break down of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires resulted in the 
redrawing of Middle Eastern boundaries; redefined by the breakdown of empires, and the 
formation of nation-states  (Arıkanlı, 2016, p. 3).  The rise of Kurdish nationalism was a 
direct result of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and provided a distinct threat to the existing 
nation state order both in the Middle East region and internationally. Arikanli (2016, p. 4) 
contends “Kurdish nationalism constituted a serious challenge both against mandatory 
powers (i.e. France and Great Britain) which had to adapt their policies to the new 
international order stamped by self-determination, and the newly-founded states (i.e. Turkey, 
French mandate of Syria and British mandates of Palestine and Iraq)”.  
The British recognised the Kurds as their own ethnonational entity and supported their 
expressions of nationalism in a strategic ploy to gain Kurdish support on the ground against 
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the Ottomans. This was a quid-pro-quo type deal, where the Kurds agreed to assist the British 
in defeating the Ottoman Empire in return for British support in the creation of an 
independent and sovereign Kurdistan. The British “promised the Kurds they would act as 
guarantors for Kurdish freedom” (Alliance for Kurdish Rights, 2016). One form of this 
support was the publication of a newspaper in the Kurdish language with the logo detailing 
the mission statement “to serve the Kurdish unity and freedom” (Bengio, Kurdish 
Awakening: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland, 2014, p. 94). A Kurdish state was 
promised to Mahmood Al-Hafeed, a Kurdish diplomat, in 1919 by the British Empire, as the 
Kurds agreed to fight against the Ottomans. This situation was summarised by the Office of 
the Civil Commission at the time, detailing: 
Military occupation of [southern Kurdistan] was quite out of the question, for, even 
after the defeat of the Turks, supply and other difficulties combined to make it 
impossible even to occupy with a garrison a point so near at hand and so important 
politically to us as [Suleymaniyya]. The alternative of adopting purely political 
methods had, therefore, to be adopted, and it was [realized] that the best means to that 
end was the exploiting of the perfectly legitimate feeling of Kurdish nationality which 
had long been making itself evident amongst the Southern Kurdish tribes  (Office of 
The Civil Commission, 1919) 
 
The British exploited Kurdish nationalism so they could manoeuvre Kurdish forces to fight 
their battles, as they lacked their own ground troops. This also demonstrated that despite 
promising the Kurds autonomous territory, the British would not have the military backing to 
enforce this decision which would have inevitably been required in response to Turkish 
disparagement.  
In the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, France and Britain agreed to divide the Ottoman 
Empire (Morris, 2016), which was officially signed as the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This 
agreement had a provision that guaranteed Kurdish territory in part of Turkey, as promised by 
the British. This treaty was signed by the Ottoman Government on 10 August 1920, and 




A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed 
by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six 
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy 
for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern 
boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of 
Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3).    
 
If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of 
the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full 
safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious 
minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British, 
French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and 
decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under 
the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia. 
The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both 
the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their 
communication to the said Government. 
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council 
of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the 
population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then 
considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it 
should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, 
and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. 
 
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate 
agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. 
 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal 
Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the 
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Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul 
vilayet. (WW1 Document Archive, 2009) 
The terms of this agreement were violently opposed by Turkish nationalists. They 
redispersed the Kurdish population within Turkish borders to ensure they remained divided 
and alienated. Whilst this treaty provided the first true opportunity for the Kurds to unite and 
“bolstered Kurdish nationalists’ aspirations by providing for a referendum to decide the issue 
of the Kurdistan homeland” (The Kurdish Project, 2016), this opportunity was squandered by 
Kurdish disunity.  
The Kurdish contingents of modern-day Iraq, Syria and Turkey were divided, which 
impeded a united Kurdish nationalist voice from emerging.  This was critical if the Kurds 
were to push the quest for Kurdish autonomy over the line. General Sherif Pasha was one of 
the few Kurdish diplomats of the time and represented the Kurds to the British ambassador in 
Paris. As a result of internal Kurdish conflicts, two Kurdish clubs in Istanbul “disowned” 
him, which led to his resignation, and the loss of a significant political voice for the Kurdish 
region (The Kurdish Project, 2016). When the Kurds finally grouped together to request a 
state through British High Commissioner in Egypt (Henry McMahon) and the Sherif of 
Mecca (Hussein bin Ali), the British had already promised the land to the Arabs and 
appointed a King of Iraq.  
In 1923, the British Empire, France, Japan, Italy, Greece, Romania and Turkey 
executed the Lausanne Treaty (Martin, 2016), which amended the Treaty of Sevres and 
detailed political sanctions and territorial definitions. This was the outcome of the Conference 
of Lausanne, held in Switzerland during 1922 and 1923. It was attended by representatives 
from Great Britain, France, Italy and Turkey (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016). 
This treaty failed to contain a provision for Kurdistan (Misra, 2015), destroying the 
chance of a consolidated Kurdish homeland. With these agreements, the Ottoman Empire was 
divided, with Turkish nationalists claiming Anatolia (modern day Turkey), the British 
claiming Mesopotamia and the French occupying the area of modern-day Syria. As the 
British reneged on their promises of a guaranteed Kurdistan, the Kurdish people remained 
divided as repressed minorities located in what was to be modern day Turkey, Iraq and Syria. 
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The Iranian Kurds formed part of the Persian Empire and were therefore untouched by these 
events.  
There was significant debate over the Mosul region during the Lausanne Conference. 
After a clear deadlock between Turkey and Great Britain, the dispute was deferred from the 
conference agenda. Eventually, British Foreign secretary Lord Curzon, brought the dispute 
before the League of Nations4 which ruled that neither Britain or Turkey had any right to 
occupy or control the area. Instead, the Kurdish population was divided between Turkey, 
Syria and Iraq (Hanioglu, 2008, p. 69). The original members comprised 24 nations, of note 
were China, France, United Kingdom, Japan and Canada. As this league comprised Great 
Powers, it is evident that they were not intent on supporting Kurdish secession.  
Even provided the Lausanne Conference discussion, the British, as victorious Great 
Powers still did nothing to follow through on their promise to the Kurds. The exact reason as 
to why the British failed to follow through on this promise is debated, however Waisy (2017) 
argues that the “extent of opposition within the British Government to incorporating 
predominantly Kurdish-inhabited territory into the new state of Iraq is scarcely recognised 
now, but it was significant”. It has also been argued that the United Kingdom changed their 
mind in supporting a Kurdish state to “appease Kemalist Turkey”5 (Ali, 1997, p. 521).  
Following the acceptance of this treaty, The Turkish government updated their 
constitution to reflect their intolerance for minorities. Article 88 of the Turkish Constitution 
defined in 1924 stated that ‘We are frankly Nationalist....and Nationalism is our only factor of 
cohesion. Before the Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. At any price, 
we must turkify the inhabitants of our land, and we will annihilate those who oppose Turks or 
'le turquisme'", highlight Turkey’s citizenship approach that “everyone in Turkey is a Turk” 
(Keles, 2015, p. 26).  
The Second Attempt 
                                                          
4 The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organisation founded on 10 
January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War. 
5 Kemalism, was the founding ideology of Turkey defined by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk aimed 
at defining social, political, cultural and religious reforms to establish a unique Turkish State 
from the Ottoman Empire (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018). 
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A second opportunity for a Kurdish state emerged during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. For 
the Iraqi and Iranian Kurds, the Iran-Iraq war was a catalyst to renew their revolt for 
independence. The Iraqi government under Saddam Husain leveraged Iraq’s Kurdish 
population and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in its fight against Iran. This 
was a strategic move for the Iraqi Kurds, who aimed to define autonomous areas by 
exploiting their access to weapons through Iraq’s channels (Entessar, 2009). The KDPI 
militia and the Iraqi forces were however rapidly weakened by 1981, after heavy casualties 
inflicted by Iran.  
In 1983, Iran emulated Baghdad’s strategy of harnessing the support of Iraq’s Kurdish 
population by securing the backing of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal 
Talabani and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP) led by Mazzoud Barzani. The Iraqi 
Kurds once again saw this as an opportunity to take control of territory, weapons and 
resources that were provided by Iran to bolster the Kurdish war effort. At one point in time, 
Kurdish fighters and Shia rebels controlled 14 out of 18 Iraqi provinces in the north and 
south; however, as U.S. aid as not forthcoming, they were conquered by Iraqi forces (Sibilla, 
2017). 
In 1984, the PUK agreed to a ceasefire with Iraq in return for the initiation of secret 
negotiations surrounding Kurdish autonomy. These negotiations fell through as Baghdad was 
unwilling to concede to Kurdish demands. The West also bolstered its support to Iraq, out of 
concern that Iran might emerge victorious. Turkey also threatened to cut off the Iraqi oil 
pipeline in case Iraq were to make a deal with the Kurds (Kreyenbroek & Sperl, 2005, p. 22). 
These two international bearings meant that Iraq no longer needed the Kurds as much as they 
first thought and deserted the negotiations. This outcome further divided Iraqi Kurdish 
groups, as hostilities increased between the PUK and the KDP (Lea, 2005). While some Iraqi 
Kurdish groups managed to regain control over parts of the semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdish 






The Third Attempt 
The third opportunity for Kurdish autonomy in Iraq emerged in the 1990s as a 
consequence of Saddam Hussein’s diabolical decision to use chemical weapons against the 
Iraqi Kurds and to invade and occupy Kuwait.  Both these events led to international outrage, 
the formation of an UN-led multinational force to evict Iraq from Kuwait and “the 
establishment of the internationally protected safe haven in northern Iraq” (Hirst , 2013). In 
1979 Saddam Hussein had come to power, torturing and killing thousands of Kurdish people 
including civilians mainly as retaliation for Kurdish attempts to expand their influence 
internationally and to overthrow the Iraqi Government. This included the multi-stage Anfal 
campaign, which was a was assisted by the Iraqi government attempting to commit genocide 
against the Kurdish people.  In 1988 the Iraqi army used chemical bombs to attack the town 
of Halabja, which killed over 200,000 Kurdish people (Zeidel, 2013). After Saddam Hussein 
launched this chemical attack, millions of Kurds fled north into the mountainous region of 
southern Turkey and northern Iraq. Facing harsh weather conditions, this soon became a 
humanitarian disaster.  
This suffering attracted international attention. In the early 1990’s, Kurdish refugees 
caught the attention of the United Nations Security Council, which passed Resolution 688 
(Nader, Hanauer, Allen, & Scotten, 2016, p. 19). This resolution condemned “the repression 
of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-
populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the 
region”, and demanded that Iraq cease this repression, and allow immediate access by 
“international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts 
of Iraq and make available all necessary facilities for their operations” (UNSCR, 1991) . It 
also called on all member states to aid humanitarian efforts. Most importantly for the Kurds, 
this resolution stated that it: 
Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report 
forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight 
of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering 
from the repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities (UNSCR, 1991). 
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Soon after this resolution was passed, the United States conducted “Operation Provide 
Comfort”, which provisioned the Kurds with food, water, clothing and supplies (Human 
Rights Watch, 2003). The U.S. sectioned off Northern Iraq as a “safe haven” in April 1991, 
where the refugees were “to be protected from further attack while receiving aid to meet their 
humanitarian needs” (Human Rights Watch, 2003). This initiative was supported by an 
international coalition comprising England, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the Netherlands 
(Ricks, 2017). This area had a “no fly zone” enforced by coalition bases in Turkey, and a “no 
go zone” established on the ground for the Iraqi army. 
This save haven provided the first true semi-autonomous Kurdish territory and allowed the 
Iraqi Kurdish people to re-forge their identity. The Iraqi Kurds’ struggle under Saddam 
Hussein’s regime consolidated their “victim” status. Authors Nader et al (2016, p. 18) have 
argued that this persecution “brought the plight of the Kurdish people to the forefront of 
international attention; and— by highlighting the Kurds’ seeming inability to live in peace in 
an Arab-majority country—inspired efforts to gain independence from Baghdad”. These 
years of conflict arguably created a common bond between the Kurds and furthered their 
drive for self-determination.  
The international protection forced the Iraqi army to withdraw from Kurdish areas 
between 1990 and 2003 and catalysed the formation of the Kurdish Regional Government 
(KRG) (Bengio, Autonomy in Kurdistan Historical Perspective, 2005, p. 175). Kurdish 
nationalism bloomed; the language became public and the media freely expressed Kurdish art 
and culture.  
The KRG led a drive to build socioeconomic infrastructure, which had been destroyed 
as a result of conflicts and wars. Whilst the Kurds managed to rebuild this infrastructure 
without international support, their development was still constrained due to their 
geographical location and dependence on the U.S. and Turkey. Hiltermann (2008) described 
this economic reliance as a “straitjacket that derived from being landlocked and utterly 
dependent on those very same states for their access to the outside world”. The U.S allowed 
Kurdish reconstructive economic development, however Turkey made sure to restrain 
anything that would potentially equate to independence. Once again, Kurdish opportunity for 
autonomy was reliant on international support which did not eventuate. 
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The Fourth Attempt 
The fourth major opportunity for Kurdish autonomy happened as a result of the 2003 United 
States invasion of Iraq, which led to the collapse of Suddam Hussein’s regime. The PUK and 
KDP fighters in the newly established Kurdish safe-haven exploited the benefits of U.S. 
intervention in the region and made the most of U.S. resources (Romano, 2006, p. 212). The 
Kurdish Pershmerga forces trained side by side with U.S. troops, giving them access to top 
tier training and weaponry. This significantly improved their position again in the region and 
allowed them to consolidate their armies.  
In 2004, soon after the U.S. led invasion of Iraq, the Kurds re-established themselves 
in the Kurdistan region of Suleimaniya and Erbil. The constitution of Iraq was amended to 
state that any referendum required an absolute majority to succeed, which meant that any 
constitution would need Kurdish approval to be passed. Hiltermann (2008) called this 
“"Kurdifying" Iraqi politics to the extent that no decision could be taken without Kurdish 
input or, more, without the threat of a Kurdish veto”. In 2004, the US Coalition Provision 
Authority oversaw the establishment of a governing council, which became the Iraq Interim 
Government under The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional 
Period (TAL). This was effectively the first post-Saddam provisional government  for Iraq, 
which included  35 Kurdish members including Rowsch Shaways from the KDP as the Vice-
President, Barham Salih from the PUK as the Deputy Prime Minister for National Security 
and Hoshyar Zebari from the KDP as the Foreign Minister (Samii, 2012).  
In 2005 the Kurds won a majority of the Kikuk Provincial Council seats in the Iraqi 
elections which consolidated their power and influence in the region and allowed them to 
dominate politics and policy in the region. 2005 to 2010 saw five years of Kurdish 
supremacy, which was arguably the prime opportunity for secession. In January 2005, an 
unofficial referendum reported that 98 percent of Kurds in Iraq wanted autonomy and 
statehood; however despite this “political opportunity structures within which the Kurdistan 
Referendum Movement operates were closed to the formation of a mass-based social 
movement” (Berwari & Ambrioso, 2008, p. 891). The Kurds failed to unite and by 2010 
when they lost their majority seats the opportunity was squandered. Kurdish parties refused to 
unite as one political group, and instead found dissident platforms including the Gorran Party 
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and The Kurdistan Islamic Union. This undermined and weakened Iraqi Kurdish political 
power and confirmed the divergent agendas within the Kurdish population regarding their 
future within Iraq.  
Over time, the Kurds have made progress in consolidating their autonomy with 
legislative power, armed forces and authority over the “mainstay of the Iraqi economy: oil” 
(Hirst , 2013). Zebari (2013) reported that “Kurdish officials confirm that oil has long been a 
curse, given that former Iraqi regimes used it to acquire weapons and quell the Kurds”, yet 
the aftermath of the U.S. invasion meant that oil became a fundamental resource for 
strengthening relationships between the Kurds and their host governments. Despite gaining 
quasi-autonomy in the recent decade, the Iraqi Kurds still rely heavily on the international 
community. Whilst this dependency has shifted over time, the Kurds currently rely on 
Baghdad for 95 percent of their economic backing (Natali, Barkey, & Ottaway, Iraqi 
Kurdistan Today: Between Autonomy and Dependency, 2010).  
Iraqi Kurdish leaders are also inherently aware of the backlash that would come from 
the international community, specifically Turkey if they declared themselves a State. 
Contemporary Kurdish leadership in Iraq have re-iterated their goals to be part of the new 
Iraq, rather than separating from it. This is however contracted by their referendum efforts 
and the pleas from the Iraqi Government and Western powers requesting they don’t go 
through with it. The central authority of Baghdad is however weak, and decentralising over 
time which in turn consolidates the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds. Samii (2012) argues that 
Iraqi Kurdistan is effectively functioning as  “a sovereign state from nearly all 
perspectives: as it has its own elected government and army to exert absolute authority over 
Kurdistan's internal affairs; a defining border which the Iraqi army is not allowed to cross; 
and an independent department of foreign relations to deal with international affairs”. 
Formalising this autonomy however is the primary challenge that the Kurds face, especially 
in the ever-changing environment.  
Discussion and Analysis 
Bengio (2005, p. 185) highlights three ‘paradoxes’ that haunt Kurdish statehood. The first 
paradox is that “only if the Kurds are united can they face internal and external challenges, 
but it is exactly the possibility of such unity that frightens the surrounding states and invites 
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their intervention”. The international normative regime is inherently biased against non-state 
nation secession, which makes external support hard to attain. Additionally, neighbouring and 
host states have demonstrated fierce resistance to Kurdish autonomy. If the Kurds were to 
achieve autonomy in Iraq (the expansion of Iraqi Kurdistan), the Iraqi central government 
would lose power and spark intervention from Turkey, the most outspoken state opposed to 
Kurdish autonomy. Neighbouring states such as Syria, Turkey and Iran would be concerned 
that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan or any Kurdish secessionist movement might inspire a 
political movement within their own borders. As such, it has been reported that the Saudi 
Arabian Government "reportedly offered the Iraqi Kurdish leaders $2 billion in exchange for 
delaying the process 10 years" (Samii, 2012).  
The second paradox is that “to mobilise the Kurdish population, the leadership has to 
set clear-cut goals, but once such a goal is declared – as was the case with the federation – it 
immediately unites the Kurd’s enemies against them” (Bengio, 2005, p. 185). A key 
endogenous factor for secession as discussed in Chapter 1 is the requirement for the non-state 
nation to have autonomous nationalism, culture and a common identity, along with the 
common political goal for independence. This requires internal cohesion and organisation to 
ensure the collective goal of self-determination and autonomy. Whilst the Kurds were 
provided with an opportune window for secession after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, their 
internal divergences have prohibited them from consolidating their stance as a political party 
and push their agenda of autonomy.  
The third and final paradox discussed by Bengio (2005, p. 185) is that “the Kurds 
need the U.S., and other Great Powers to guarantee their autonomy, but this dependence on a 
superpower might turn them back into a disposable card in the game of great and regional 
powers”. Chapter 1 highlighted that in order to achieve secession, a non-state nation must 
have attempted to gain recognition of that independence by other states and international 
organisations, as international support and recognition of autonomy and sovereign statehood 
is a critical factor for secession. This support requires the official recognition of 
independence from other states, including neighbouring states along with international 
organisations such as the European Union. In 2008, Martin Indyk, director of the Saban 
Center stated that Obama (as a then Presidential candidate) was willing to support the Kurds 
if they “condemned the PKK attacks on Turkey and refrained from declaring independence”. 
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This comment has proved true, as while the U.S. has provided material support to the Iraqi 
Kurds, Washington has not followed through with promises to support the Kurds in attaining 
statehood. This was demonstrated in 2001 through the U.S. led “Operation Provide Comfort”, 
which provisioned the Kurds with food, water, clothing and supplies but failed to provide 
consolidated diplomatic support for independence or autonomy.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored four key Kurdish self-determination attempts for secession 
throughout the 20th century. These “windows of opportunity” have been analysed, to 
determine the reasons for failure. Through these opportunities, it can be concluded that 
Kurdish internal disunity, lack of international support and recognition, and the inevitable 
backlash from neighbouring and host states are the three key endogenous and exogenous 
factors that have historically inhibited Kurdish autonomy. These four attempts and 
prohibiting factors will be discussed in comparison to the contemporary situation, to 
determine whether the current state of affairs in the Middle East could provide the long-





Chapter 4: The Contemporary Situation 
The Middle East has been a region of conflicts for hundreds of years, providing a tumultuous 
backdrop to Kurdish nationalist history. As explored in previous chapters, Kurdish 
nationalism emerged in greater strength following World War 1. This fuelled numerous 
revolts which were all unsuccessful in achieving autonomy or statehood due to a mix of 
exogenous and endogenous factors. The key endogenous factor that has historically blocked 
Kurdish chances of seceding is the lack of internal unity and cohesion within the Kurdish 
contingents. This has repeatedly precluded the Kurds from forming a united front and 
fighting for autonomy and independence as they have been distracted by internal divergences 
and a lack of consolidated direction and leadership. This was exemplified by the way the 
Kurds squandered the opportunity for secession provided by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, 
as their internal differences undermined their ability to form a cohesive political agenda.  
The key exogenous factors that have historically inhibited the Kurdish quest for 
autonomy and independence include the lack of support from the UN and the Great Powers. 
Not only is the international normative regime strongly against non-state nation secession, 
neighbouring states such as Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq are fiercely opposed to Kurdish 
autonomy and Statehood. The Kurds have also failed to receive consolidated international 
support in the form of both material and political backing. The U.S. and other great powers 
have occasionally provided the Kurds with material support and limited political backing, 
such as the provisioning of a no-fly zone in 2001. However, they have not truly followed 
through with promises to support the Kurds towards their goal of full autonomy, recognition 
and statehood. The Kurdish situation has not changed, and these exogenous and endogenous 
factors remain extant.  
This chapter will analyse the current situation, being that of the last decade, in the 
Middle East in terms of territory, conflict, the internal situation for each Kurdish non-state 
nation contingent, Major Power strategy and interests, geopolitical stakeholders and the 
international normative regime and stance of influencing IGO’s and non-state actors. It will 
contrast the previous Kurdish struggles for independent statehood with the contemporary 
situation in Iraq, Syria and to a lesser extent Turkey, and comment on the chances of 
contemporary Kurdish secession. In the context of the current wars in the Middle East, do the 
Kurds stand a realistic chance of seceding from Iraq and Syria? Can they bury their 
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differences and create a sovereign Kurdistan State? What major obstacles stand in their way 
of achieving this long-cherished goal?   
Contemporary Conflict 
From 2013, the Kurds have capitalised on the regional conflict and diaspora that was 
brought about during the chaos of the fight against terrorist organisations, including Al Qaeda 
and Islamic State. This conflict has resulted in the re-drawing of borders, and a re-shuffle of 
territorial holdings. Islamic State’s Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi highlighted its goal to 
redraw the borders in the Middle East, stating: “this blessed advance will not stop until we hit 
the last nail in the coffin of the Sykes-Picot conspiracy.” (Wright, 2016). This provided a key 
opportunity for the Kurds to expand their territory. They gained control over the majority of 
the area to which they had always held ancestral claims. The conflict against Islamic State 
allowed the Kurds to consolidate the Kurdish Regional Government area in Northern Iraq 
which is also referred to as Iraqi Kurdistan or Southern Kurdistan. This expansion of territory 
gave the Kurds the largest semi-autonomous area that they had inhabited for decades and 
gained them control over oil-rich areas which provided economic leverage within the region 
(Pecanha, 2017). These key territorial and economic gains provided a backdrop of prosperity 
for the Kurds to finally pursue their goal of self-determination.  
Kurdish Independence Referendum 
A Kurdish referendum was originally intended to be held in 2014, however, it was 
delayed due to the significant pressure imposed by Islamic State’s expansion, along with 
significant financial and political pressure on the Kurdish people from reduced oil prices and 
regional instability (Klain & Hintz, 2017). For years, the Kurdish state employees were 
unpaid. This resulted in the gradual deterioration of the KRG’s unity, and heightened 
frustrations. The political standing of the Kurds was fractured from the outset, with 
opposition groups, such as the Movement for Change or Gorran and Kurdistan Islamic Group 
(Komal), reiterating their disagreement with the referendum plans; a stance that they revoked 
only days before the referendum date. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also strongly 
opposed the plans, and further divided the Kurdish sentiment. Despite a divided community, 
Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani decided to take advantage of the retreating Islamic State and 
call the referendum in late 2017.  
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In September 2017, the Kurdish people finally held the referendum in which 93% of 
Iraqi Kurds voted for independence from Baghdad (McKernan, 2017). The question posed to 
the Kurds was “do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the 
administration of the region to become an independent state?” (Park, Jongerden, Owtram, & 
Yoshioka, 2017, p. 2). The Iraqi government opposed the referendum from early planning 
stages, with the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declaring it as unconstitutional and 
calling for the Iraqi Supreme Court to forcibly suspend it (Rasheed & Jalabi, 2017). Turkey 
and Syria also strongly opposed the referendum as they were concerned it might spark 
separatist action within their own borders from their Kurdish minority populations.  
The international community strongly opposed the referendum for fear that it would 
further destabilise the region. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued a 
statement that supported the extant territorial integrity of Iraq, noting “concern over the 
potentially destabilizing impact of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s plans to unilaterally 
hold a referendum”. The UNSC also noted that the referendum could potentially interrupt key 
efforts in countering Islamic State. This was because critical operations were scheduled 
during that time that required Kurdish support. The UNSC stated that it “could detract from 
efforts to ensure the safe, voluntary return of over three million refugees and internally 
displaced persons” (United Nations Security Council, 2017). The United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Russia issued formal statements opposing the referendum 
(Cockburn, 2017), making specific comments that the efforts in the region should focus on 
the fight against Islamic State. Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Stuart Jones, argued that 
“There is no ambiguity on what the U.S. position was on this issue. The United States has 
been telling the Kurds and telling [Kurdish President] Masoud [Barzani], and telling Masrour 
[Barzani, his heir apparent] since last spring not to proceed with this because this would be 
not good for Kurdistan, not good for Iraq, and would play into the hands of the hardliners and 
the hands of the Iranians” (Calamur, 2017). The United States, United Kingdom and United 
Nations suggested a results-orientated alternative to discuss territorial disputes, with a 
resolution timeline of three years (Park, Jongerden, Owtram, & Yoshioka, 2017). Barzani 
rejected this suggestion and refused any proposed support and mediation offers from the 
international community (Rasheed & Jalabi, 2017).  
65 
 
The international community took measures to deter the Kurdish leaders from 
proceeding further. An international flight ban was instigated by the U.S. on the Kurdish 
airports, and a series of suppression measures were implemented including the call for arrest 
warrants for those whom organised the referendum and a ban on U.S. Dollars being sold to 
Kurdish regional banks. The Iraqi Parliament authorised the use of force to reclaim Kurdish 
territory, including Kirkuk (BasNews, 2017). This move was tacitly supported by the UN and 
Great Powers. Only days after the referendum, Iraqi government forces reclaimed the 
majority of this territory, including Kirkuk, nearby towns and oil fields. This was a direct 
military assault, carried out to curb Kurdish independence and stop the possibility of a 
Kurdish nation being developed in northern Iraq. Zucchino (2017) argues that “despite the 
resounding success of the referendum, Iraqi forces were able to take Kirkuk in a single day 
and with little fight, partly because it is a multiethnic city of Kurds, Turkmens and Arabs, and 
partly because the Kurds themselves were divided”. The Iraqi Government had an agreement 
with one of the Kurdish factions that controlled key parts of their territory, including Kirkuk 
which allowed Baghdad access into the city, to remove the Kurdish flag and to leave an Iraqi 
flag in its place. This therefore evidence of defection and co-optation. This was received 
overwhelming well from the other Iraqi, Arab and Turkish occupants of Kirkuk who formed 
cheering crowds around Iraqi forces and fired gunshots into the air in celebration (Zucchino, 
2017) The U.S. refused to be involved in the conflict, with a Pentagon spokeswoman stating 
that they were simply “monitoring the situation closely and strongly urge all sides to avoid 
additional escalatory actions” and that they “oppose violence from any party, and urge 
against destabilizing actions that distract from the fight against ISIS and further undermine 
Iraq’s stability” (Al Jazeera, 2017).  
Whilst the 93% support rate showed overwhelming backing from those who voted, 
this statistic did not have the support to drive change. It was purely a statement of intent, 
rather than a strategic plan for secession. The results were never intended to be binding, and it 
was clear that the ramifications would be political rather than legal (Dalay, 2017). It was 
reported that whilst Kurdish Leader Massoud Barzani led the referendum under the guise of 
achieving a historic milestone towards Kurdish independence and homeland, it could have 
also been a distraction from the worsening economic situation under his authoritarian rule. 
The referendum was described as a strong expression of aspiration for Kurdish regional 
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autonomy, however “in practical tactics the factions have shown themselves divided and the 
limitations of a polity organised around family-dominated politics and militias have been 
cruelly exposed” (Park, Jongerden, Owtram, & Yoshioka, 2017, p. 214). Whilst the 
referendum should have united the Kurdish people and consolidated the political factions 
within the Kurdish Region of Iraq, it instead further exposed these divisions and invited 
regional and international backlash. It further divided the Kurdish people and left them even 
more powerless to counter the moves of their opposition. The Kurdish referendum lost the 
Kurds their strong hold over territory and critical oil revenue, which provided them critical 
political leverage. It also sparked further tensions with neighbouring countries including 
Turkey and angered the United States. According to Hiltermann (2017) from the International 
Crisis Group, the Kurdish decision to hold a referendum was a “miscalculation of historic 
proportions by proceeding with the referendum over the objections of just about everyone 
who counts”. This decision further inflamed relationships with all key regional stakeholders 
and resulted in irreparable backlash. As summarised by Hintz and Klain (2017), “with little 
possibility for any shift in regional support, acquiescence from Baghdad, or unity among 
Kurdish groups anytime in the near future, Iraqi Kurds’ independence aspirations now seem 
more distant than ever”.  
The U.S. and the Kurds 
Whilst the U.S.-Kurdish relationship dates back to World War I when the American 
government supported, in principle, the establishment of a Kurdish state after the breakdown 
of the Ottoman Empire, the U.S. Government has provided inconsistent and conditional 
support, which has not been comprehensive enough to truly back Kurdish autonomy. Most of 
the U.S. support to the Kurds has been material, rather than political. This support includes 
the provision of weapons, training, advice and assistance (Specia, 2018). A prime example of 
this has been demonstrated in the last few years when the U.S. pledged arms, ammunition and 
aid  to the Kurdish Regional Government in return for their military assistance  in the fight 
against the Islamic State. The U.S. led coalition also pledged that it “continues to provide 
material support, training, advice and assistance to the Syrian Democratic Forces in their 
ongoing effort to defeat ISIS in Syria” (Frantzman, 2017), which comprises Kurdish fighters.  
Supporting the Kurds has always been secondary to U.S. regional interests. In recent 
years, it has been clear that the U.S. has been chasing the establishment of stability in Iraq 
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more than they need leverage with the Kurds. Former U.S. ambassador summarised the 
reasons why the U.S. refused to support the Kurds in their referendum, or to form a Kurdish 
state:  
A: The KRG is not economically viable. B: The political conditions were simply not 
prepared. There’s a very sharp reaction from Iran. There’s a sharp reaction from 
Turkey. A sharp reaction from Baghdad. So, the neighbours weren’t prepared for this. 
They weren’t willing to go along. There were a lot of issues that were not resolved. 
(Calamur, 2017)  
The Kurds themselves accept that even if they did declare independence, without 
international support, including economic partnerships and military alliances, they would not 
survive. Talabani (Calamur, 2017) argued the hypothetical, saying  
let us imagine that Iraqi Kurdistan declared independence, and Iran, Syria, Turkey, 
and Iraq didn’t fight it but just closed their borders. How could we live? Let us say, 
we’ve got our oil—how could we export it? And you can be sure that if Kurdistan 
declares independence Iran will attack, Turkey will attack, Syria will attack—and Iraq 
will not accept it. We cannot resist all these countries. 
 The recent Kurdish referendum succeeded in frustrating the United States and further 
prevented the Kurds from achieving support for their quest for autonomy.  
The decision to proceed with the referendum, despite the litany of warnings from 
neighbouring states and international community was arguably a smoke screen orchestrated 
by Barzani to hide the internal political chaos and financial situation of the KRG. This 
disunity has been a key endogenous factor that has consistently inhibited Kurdish political 
cohesion. The KRG Washington representative Abdul Rahim reinforced this, stating that 
“Disunity is definitely our Achilles heel. Kurdish disunity is our worst enemy. Whatever we 
think of our opponents and detractors, our disunity is our worst enemy” (Calamur, 2017). The 
Kurds have consistently been hindered by their inability to form a cohesive front. The recent 
referendum provides an additional contemporary example of this. Despite multiple 
opportunities in recent decades, the Kurds have remained internally fractured, with 




The Iraqi Government is intent on establishing democracy, but it has been repressing Kurdish 
independence out of concern that such a development might reduce its power and revenue. It 
viewed the Kurdish referendum as unconstitutional and was concerned it “could lead to 
ethnic divisions, exposing (the Iraqis) to disastrous dangers that only God knows” 
(Chmaytelli & Butler, 2017). Despite the overwhelming “yes” vote for Kurdish 
independence, Iraq refused to negotiate and instead responded with military force and took 
back Kurdish territory and oil fields and isolated the KRG (Cockburn, 2017). This has set 
back negotiations between Baghdad and Kurdish leaders and fuelled political skirmishes. A 
recent example of this is the Iraqi Government’s slashing of the 2018 Kurdish budget 
allocation (Middle East Eye, 2018). The Iraqi Government’s priority is regional stability and 
democracy. If Kurdish secession inhibits this goal, Baghdad can be expected to intervene. 
Therefore, this provides another exogenous factor of host state repression and violence.  
Turkey also has a long history of resentment towards the Kurds, which has escalated 
in recent years. It regards the Kurds as terrorists and a threat to its territorial sovereignty 
(Gall, 2018). Turkey has repressed its Kurdish population for decades, resulting in numerous 
rebel insurgencies against the state (Hatem & Dohrmann, 2013, p. 49). Most of these 
uprisings have been led by the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), and have been inflamed by 
Turkey’s attacks on Kurdish positions in Iraq and Syria (Chan, 2018). Whilst Turkey has a 
vested interest in annihilating the presence of Islamic State, it also has a strong interest in 
ensuring the Kurds do not progress their goals for self-determination. This concern is 
mirrored by Iran, which is also worried about its Kurdish minority attempting to secede. 
Turkey has conducted a myriad of attacks on Kurdish forces, under the guise of fighting 
Islamic State. This has all been a targeted effort to subdue Kurdish autonomy and regional 
power and influence. Turkey is concerned that Kurdish autonomy would support the PKK 
and motivate a secession attempt from the Kurdish minority in Turkey. The Turkish Prime 
Minister declared that Kurdish independence would be a direct security threat to Turkey 
(Hacaoglu & Ant, 2017). If the Kurds were to declare independence and form a state, Turkey 
would respond with considerable political power and violence. This remains a considerable 
exogenous factor opposed to Kurdish self-determination and autonomy.  
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The recent conflict in the Middle East has additionally inflamed tensions between the 
U.S. and Turkey, thereby further complicating U.S. support for the Kurds. Turkey considers 
Syria’s YPG and Iraq’s KRG as being too close to the PKK rebel group. They resent the U.S. 
armament of the KRG and are concerned that any Kurdish autonomy could spark an uprising 
of their own repressed Kurdish minority (Feldman, 2017). This has sparked tension between 
the U.S. and Turkey, as the U.S. walks a fine line between fighting in partnership with 
Turkey against the Islamic State and supporting Kurdish contingents. The U.S recently 
announced a plan to establish a 30,000-person border security force in partnership with the 
PYD to secure Syria’s borders with Iraq and Turkey (Torode & Wen, 2018). This has 
naturally sparked Turkey’s concern about the potential of Kurdish autonomous regions along 
the border. Turkey has a history of antagonising their relationship with the U.S. In 2017 and 
2018, Turkish forces attacked Kurdish troops in Syria that were involved in an offensive 
against Islamic State with US backing (Gall, 2018). This directly undermined U.S. goals and 
skyrocketed tensions between the two NATO allies. Fundamentally, the U.S. has more to 
gain from its relationship with Turkey than what it does from supporting the Kurds (Chan, 
2018). This fact will arguably transcend current tensions.  
Russia is also a key player in recent conflict, due to its regional proximity and 
economic interests within the region. In February of 2017, media leaked that during a 
Kurdish conference in Moscow, Russia was said to be in “favor of a new constitution in Syria 
that would be open to Kurdish autonomy” (Yetkin, 2017). There has been evidence of 
Russia’s support for Kurdish autonomy in both Syria and Iraq.  
Moscow’s position has been recently articulated in a statement by the Russian Foreign 
ministry in September 2017, which stated that Russia maintains their “unwavering 
commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the friendly Iraq and other 
Middle Eastern states” and that “Moscow respects the national aspirations of the Kurds” 
(Yetkin, 2017). Further to this, the statement claimed that “we believe that all disputes that 
may exist between the Iraqi federal government and the government of the Autonomous 
Kurdish Region can and should be solved through constructive and respectful dialogue, with 
a view to devising a mutually acceptable formula of coexistence within a single Iraqi state” 
(Yetkin, 2017). Russia was the only Great Power that did not call on the Iraqi Kurds to cancel 
their referendum for independence in September 2017. It is also one of the top funders of 
70 
 
Kurdish oil and gas deals, according to Reuters (2017), pledging over $4 billion in less than a 
year. Russia also recently engaged in a trade agreement with Erbil, which make Russia 
surpass the United States as the largest oil trader in Northern Iraq (Fenton-Harvey, 2017). It 
is therefore in its interests to facilitate peace within the region, in order to maintain its 
economic prosperity. A statement made by Vladimir Putin at an energy forum in October 
2017 highlighted that he is “exercising a policy of non-interference and using cautious 
rhetoric after the independence referendum in Iraq’s Kurdistan in order not to explode the 
situation in the region” (Shikara, 2017). Russia’s stance is relatively clear; that it respects the 
wishes of the Kurds however will aim to do so in a way that meets its own desires. Russia’s 
involvement could also influence Turkey and Iran to reconsider their hostile policies against 
the KRG, under fear of attracting Russia’s wrath.  
Fundamentally, the Kurds are still internally divided. Barzani and Talabani still lead 
decision making, and don’t necessarily represent the fair and true interests of their people. 
Proceeding with the referendum despite imminent domestic and international repercussions 
provided a prime example of this corrupted leadership. After the recent backlash from the 
referendum, the Kurds would be hoping to take some steps forward again in the Iraqi election 
schedules for May 2018 (Al-Marashi, 2018). They would be hoping for the lifting of 
economic sanctions imposed by Baghdad, clarifications surrounding oil exports, payment of 
public wages, a share of the Iraqi Government budget and the resumption of the processes 
concerning Article 140 of the constitution. It is also likely that the three Kurdish provinces of 
Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah will vote for the Kurdish parties in the upcoming elections. It 
is also likely that the KDP will control Dohuk and Erbil, whilst the PUK’s support of 
Sulamaniyah is more uncertain due to the challenge imposed by the opposition parties. These 
divisions could cause a litany of negative outcomes and will continue to hinder the Kurdish 
goal of autonomy for the near future.  
Conclusion 
The recent decade following the U.S. invasion of Iraq has seen considerable conflict in the 
Middle East. This conflict has re-drawn borders and provided a critical window of 
opportunity for Kurdish secession. It has provided the Kurds with a chance to leverage off the 
international backing provided to them to fight Islamic State which has afforded them semi-
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autonomous territory, economic relationships through oil trading and influence through their 
political representation in Iraq.  
This chapter has analysed the current Kurdish situation in the Middle East, and 
focused commentary on the Kurdish goal of secession in Iraq. The key exogenous and 
endogenous factors have been discussed, to frame the argument that the Kurds are not in a 
position to achieve secession. Once again, this is the result of internal divergences, lack of 
international recognition and support, and lastly the imminent backlash that would occur 
from the host and neighbouring states including Iraq and Syria. Until these factors are 






This thesis has argued that while endogenous factors are important, secession by non-state 
nations is almost impossible without international recognition and support, especially from 
the Great Powers and leading IGO’s; since such support is exceptionally hard to obtain, 
successful secession by non-state nations is rare in international politics.  
 
This thesis has put forward two fundamental arguments, to prove this hypothesis. Firstly, this 
thesis has contended that non-state nations like the Kurds seek sovereign statehood because 
the essence of nationhood and national self-determination is sovereign statehood; and that 
non-state nations are usually treated unfairly and unjustly by their host state and thus develop 
a strong moral case for secession and sovereign statehood.  
 
Secondly, this thesis has demonstrated that non-state nations like the Kurds fail to achieve 
sovereign statehood mainly because of endogenous and exogenous reasons: (endogenous) 
groups like the Kurds that are internally divided often fail to launch an unified secessionist 
challenge; different factions/platforms pull in different directions; and chances of regime co-
optation of dissident factions remains high; (exogenous) the international normative regime is 
unsupportive of secession, hence non-state nations like the Kurds do not receive support from 
the UN and other global bodies in their quest for sovereign statehood; and that non-state 
nations also seldom receive the backing from Major Powers (both democratic and non-
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